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# ***JPRS Report***

## **East Europe**

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# East Europe

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### **Bulgarian Perspective on Macedonian Military**

92BA0476A Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 28 Jan 92 p 7

[Article by Goran Gotev in Belgrade: "The Macedonian National Army Will Be Under the Lion Banner, Too"]

[Text] Macedonia has a 620-km boundary with Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania and a 230-km boundary with Serbia. Until recently, the Macedonian leaders, in contrast to the positions of the largest—and already opposition—party, VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity], were defending the thesis that the new Macedonian state would have no army, only its own police forces backing up international guarantees of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. As early as the preelection platform, the VMRO-DPMNE pressed for a final split with Yugoslavia, for establishment of its own state, and, naturally, for its own armed forces in its defense. This party suggested that the traditional historical symbol of the population of Macedonia—the lion—should be part of the state coat of arms.

The Macedonian leaders, in whom traditional political forces have dominated for the past 50 years, rejected this suggestion because, throughout the Yugoslav crisis, they have operated on two parallel tracks—for both Macedonia's independence and forcing it into a new Yugoslav community. Their presumption was that in such a community the army, money, and diplomacy would be common, something the VMRO-DPMNE resolutely opposed.

The first minister of internal affairs in the new multi-party government, Yordan Mialkov, was a convinced champion of the establishment of Macedonia's own armed forces, and he took concrete measures to convert the local territorial defense into the backbone of the future national army. Mialkov was killed under mysterious circumstances in an automobile accident near the Serbian town of Bujanovac, not far from Prohor Pcinjski Monastery, where the establishment of Tito's Macedonia was proclaimed.

The rude reality of the harsh Serbian dictates and of the undisguised claims in the Serbian National Skupstina on Macedonia as being "historic Serbian territory," "Southern Serbia" as being a republic with 300,000 and even 400,000 Serbs rather than 44,000, made the Macedonian leaders change their positions. To this contributed their contacts with various EC states, which clearly suggested that, if Skopje actually wanted independence, it could not sit on two stools—Macedonian as well as Yugoslav. Matters thus eventuated in frank rejection of prospects of joining a truncated Yugoslavia consisting of only Serbia, Montenegro, and any Serbian territories from Bosnia and Hercegovina. Belgrade reacted quickly to the change of wind in Skopje. In the new military reorganization, the new Montenegrin military district was taken out of the third military district, with its center in Skopje, but, to make up for it, there was added the Nis military district, in which is the center of the Yugoslav

special-purpose elite troops, the so-called special troops. Appointed commander of the military district was the tried and true "frontline soldier," Colonel General Nikola Uzelac, who not only commanded the central Croatian front but also directed the illegal arming of the Serbian population in Bosnia and Hercegovina. The execution of these decisions was accompanied by the immediate dispatch of Yugoslav troops and combat materiel into Macedonian territory after expensive armaments—aircraft, missiles, radar, and so forth—had previously been withdrawn therefrom for fear that, in the event of a conflict, they would fall into Macedonian hands.

The continuing lack of a military minister after the previous minister, Dr. Risto Damjanovski, was removed because of his subordination to the Yugoslav command rather than to the Macedonian government also affected hesitations about association with the national defense. At the hand of the ministry now is Prof. Trajan Gocevski, to whose name is linked a return to the ideas of establishing Macedonia's own army. The thesis of a state without an army has been finally abandoned. The Macedonian Assembly is hard at work drafting a law on national defense. Professor Gocevski has stated that "the republic must shape its defense structures."

The leadership of Macedonia intends to create armed forces 20,000 to 30,000 strong. The outlays for them will not exceed the funds that the republic was hitherto spending for the support of the Yugoslav army—that is, a little more than 10 percent of the gross social product. As for combat materiel, Macedonia is pressing the Yugoslav Army for its due share because, during the past 50 years, the republic has paid the Yugoslav Army sums with which the armed forces of at least several states could be created. On this matter, the new military minister, Professor Gocevski, is pressing for immediate negotiations with the Yugoslav command; his immediate goal is to further the removal from Macedonia of expensive combat materiel. The Army must understand, Professor Gocevski emphasizes, that there is no force that can stop the people if they come to the barracks and simply halt the removal of materiel that lawfully belongs to them.

### **Greek, Bulgarian Economic Interests Analyzed**

#### **Regional Ties**

92BA0367A Sofia DELOVI SVYAT in Bulgarian  
9 Dec 91 p 5

[Article by Docent Stefan Karastoyanov, candidate of geographic sciences and head of the Regional and Political Geography Group at St. Kliment Ohridski Sofia University, and Associate Nartsis Gudev: "Geographic Prerequisites for Bulgarian-Greek Economic Integration"]

[Text] The nature of the geographic (economic-geographic) aspects of the intensification of integration

processes among individual European countries (members of the EC, EFTA [European Free Trade Association], and the East European countries) is one of steady increase of the influence of interregional trade on the development of the territorial and sectorial structure of the national economies.

The intensive integration processes, particularly those that influence the location of production facilities, could encompass an extensive area in Eastern, Southeastern, Central, Western, and Southern Europe, which we could describe as the integration area. It includes all European countries. (Somewhat conventionally, we could add to this group Ireland, Great Britain, and the Scandinavian countries.)

The great variety of natural features in Europe is no obstacle to the economic integration processes. Nor are there long distances to complicate communications. From the central industrial areas of Russia and Ukraine to the longest industrial axis in Western Europe, which follows the Rhine River, the distance ranges between 2,000 and 2,500 km. This distance can be easily crossed with a well-developed network of canals and inexpensive maritime haulage.

The variety of mineral and biological resources is a major base for the development of trade and other forms of economic cooperation among the individual European countries and their economic groups. Let us not forget that the Eastern areas of the USSR, essentially Siberia and Central Asia, with their huge deposits of hydrocarbon raw materials and others, are separated from Europe by the purely conventional boundary of the Urals.

The new political and geographic conditions of neighborhood between two countries could acquire a new importance and a new meaning. It could contribute to the gradual elimination of the negative consequences of the uneven territorial location of the most important mineral resources and encourage the most efficient joint utilization of huge or existing sources of energy, raw materials, and others, located in one country or another.

The geographic meaning of such neighborhood includes equally the possibility of establishing direct interaction in the border areas and, through them, between the territorial structures of the individual countries.

The geographic integrality of the Eurasian macroregion is a major prerequisite for the creation of a highly efficient international transportation system—railroad, highway, and waterway facilities; high-tension power cables; pipelines; and others. That was the reason for the creation of the new economic formation as of 1 January 1993, which will be known as the European Economic Area and which will initially combine the 12 EC and the seven EFTA members. Gradually, during the next stage, the East European countries will become affiliated with this area.

Naturally, in this context, the following question arises: What are the main geographic prerequisites for enhancing economic integration between Bulgaria and Greece?

The economic role of our proximity will gradually increase thanks to our relatively small territories. A most basic study of the location of our countries would require an assessment of the complementing economic nature and the differences in natural and labor resources and nature of production forces of either country.

Under contemporary conditions, geographic location has acquired an additional feature: compensation. International compensation arrangements are particularly important to small countries because the need of transit facilities, in their cases, is particularly essential.

The use of compensation is one of the incentives for the economic development of border areas that, in the course of economic interaction, could acquire the aspect of contact economic zones.

Our border with the Republic of Greece is 493 km long. Despite the high-mountain topography, convenient roads cross the Bulgarian-Greek border. This mainly applies to the highway and the railroad from Sofia via Blagoevgrad and Kulata to Salonica and Athens, which are part of the Trans-European Moscow-Kiev-Bucharest-Sofia road to Athens. There are also good-quality connections for Greece to Western and Central Europe in the Sofia-Belgrade-Vienna-Munich and Sofia-Vidin-Calafat-Budapest-Prague-Berlin routes.

Also of great importance is the Khaskovo-Kurdzhali highway leading to Komotini, Kavalla, and Alexandroupolis. Unfortunately, for more than 40 years, this most direct way from the Danube to the Aegean Sea remained virtually unused, for political reasons. The Ruse-Stara Zagora-Kurdzhali-Podkova railroad line can link the railroad systems of the two countries to another important area between Podkova and Komotini.

The roads between Gotse Delchev and Drama (respectively, Xanthi and Kavalla), Rudozem and Xanthi, and Ivaylovgrad and Dhidhimotikhon, which were equally neglected for decades, are significant for the region. The Svilengrad-Edirne-Alexandroupolis railroad connection is also of indirect value.

Currently, real use is made of only the Kulata border control point, which results in its significant overloading and lengthening the hauling distances and which hinders the development of the other Bulgarian and Greek border areas.

Have these advantages provided by our proximity been used so far? The answer is no. Here is a single proof: In 1990, as well, trade between Bulgaria and the other Balkan countries accounted for no more than 4.6 percent of Bulgaria's foreign trade; it is only with Greece that trade figures have been more than symbolic.



This fact hardly warrants comment. Today Bulgaria is a free democratic state. An economic foundation has been laid to facilitate and protect foreign investments. This is on the one hand. On the other, Greece is the only Balkan member of the EC.

It is entirely natural for Bulgaria's distance to the European economic structures to be covered with Greek help. It is no accident that, through the INTEREK [expansion unknown] program, Greece is already engaged in the development of economic relations in the border zones of the two countries. That was also the objective of the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] program, which provided a basis for the opening of 28 joint enterprises. All of this leads us to believe that it is precisely Greece that will act as the lever of the EC in stimulating Bulgaria's stable development.

In most general terms, how can we describe the use of the most important geographic prerequisites for economic integration between Bulgaria and Greece?

- **Gradual establishment of a mutually profitable transportation infrastructure.** The Port of Lom could most actively service Greek foreign trade along the Danube River and the Danube-Main-Rhine canal system, to which Greece has no access and that could become its most important port of export to Central European countries. At the same time, the Port of Salonica would become the principal port for Bulgarian foreign trade across the Mediterranean, the more so since a reorientation of a high percentage of our trade from Eastern Europe to other areas in the world is becoming apparent. In this context, the transit role of the Lom-Sofia-Salonica railroad and highway will increase immeasurably and will require substantial technical improvements in both. This is attainable because, in addition to Greece, which is directly interested in financing this project, the international significance of this link between the Danube and the Aegean Sea will attract other foreign investments, as well.

Furthermore, it will be helpful to both countries if Bulgaria makes use of the Alexandroupolis Port and Greece uses the Ports of Burgas and Varna to import and export goods in the Black Sea Basin. This calls for improving the existing highway between Kurdzhali and Komotini and eventually laying rail tracks and making more intensive use of the tracks linking Svilengrad to Alexandroupolis.

Although important, but of local significance, would be the development of transportation relations between Gotse Delchev and Drama (Kavalla) and between Rudozem and Xanthi, as well as between Ivaylovgrad and Dhimitikhon.

Furthermore, because of their favorable geographic locations, the two countries could also be used for pipeline imports and exports of petroleum and petroleum products. This is mandatory, above all, because neither

country is sufficiently endowed with thermal energy resources and depends on international market conditions for this sector.

- **The creation of a free economic zone that would include the territory of both countries.** In Bulgaria, it should cover the southern parts of Sofia and the Plovdiv and Khaskovo Oblasts; in Greece, it would extend to Aegean Macedonia and Western Thrace. Such a free economic zone would make it possible to make direct use of all of the advantages that already exist in what will be the future European Economic Area. This zone of active economic trade and free investments will be the foundation for the creation of a mechanism through which the former socialist countries in Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, in particular) will quite naturally become part of the production and territorial structure of a united Europe.

### Businessman's Views

92BA0367B Sofia DELOVI SVYAT in Bulgarian  
1 Jan 92 p 3

[Interview with Greek businessman Konstandinos Livadhas by Dimitur Deliyiski; place and date not given: "Honest, Sustained, and Advantageous Cooperation"—first two paragraphs are DELOVI SVYAT introduction]

[Text] Greek businessman Konstandinos Livadhas is already investing in Bulgaria and will participate in the Bulgarian-Greek business meeting because he believes in honest, durable, and profitable cooperation.

It was only at the end of our discussion that I asked Mr. Livadhas to briefly describe his career. Although he had answered my previous questions in great detail, he did answer this one briefly: He was born in Salonica, graduated from the School of Law of Athens University, and has worked as district administrator of Thessaly, which is in northern Greece.

[Deliyski] Mr. Livadhas, do you believe the prevalent opinion in some Bulgarian circles, above all among businessmen, that our country could hope for an opening to the EC not through Germany but exclusively through Greece? According to some, this is an illusion, whereas others are seriously betting on this option. What is your view?

[Livadhas] Please emphasize in your notes that anything I say is my personal view, my personal impression, and my personal assessment. I believe that once a climate of good-neighbor relations and cooperation between our two countries has been established, more realistic use should be made of this climate. This could be accomplished only through the development of economic relations. Why do I think so? If you look at the map, you will see that Greece is the extension of the projection of Bulgaria, and vice versa: Greece's projection to the north is Bulgaria. Furthermore, our proximity not only would provide an impetus for the development of our economic relations but also would make them mandatory. It is on

the basis of such views that I undertook my activities here. Obviously, however, the efforts of both countries are needed—above all, those of the businessmen. I believe that our cooperation should be developed on an equal footing. To me, this is the main factor in honest, lengthy, and profitable cooperation.

The specific answer to your question is that I do not consider it an illusion for Greece to offer Bulgaria the opportunity to join the structures of the EC. On the contrary, those who are promoting this idea clearly see matters in perspective. Unquestionably, Bulgaria could not become a member of the EC tomorrow. However, the serious politicians and commentators unanimously believe that the unification of Europe is inevitable. The expansion of the EC will take place in stages once the separate countries have reached a certain level of development. Greece, as well, could contribute to a rapid attainment of the conditions necessary for Bulgaria to acquire an opportunity to become a member of the EC.

[Deliyski] Do you believe that the laws that were passed by the Grand National Assembly and those the present National Assembly intend to pass encourage Greek businessmen to invest in our country?

[Livadas] I believe that the prohibition on purchasing land is a major obstacle to investment. I realize the problems facing Bulgaria, and I know that you are fully justified when you pay close attention to the land. However, I believe that, under certain circumstances and in some cases, foreign investors should be allowed to purchase land and real estate. However, since you asked me about the law, I would not say that the Law on Commerce, for example, is a hindrance to foreign investment. However, the Law on Foreign Investments requires major additions. It should make the foreign investor confident that, should some of his investments in your country prove to be inefficient, he would have only himself to blame. In other words, the conditions that would make him decide to come here and invest should not be amended, and in no case should any amendments be retroactive. That way he would be the only one responsible for the success or failure of his company.

[Deliyski] But you know that, whenever a new political force takes over, it begins to change the laws.

[Livadas] That is entirely normal. A political force assumes power because of the attractiveness of its program. It can pass or amend laws in accordance with that program. However, what it regulates should apply to the

future and not to the past. That is precisely something that foreign investors must believe.

[Deliyski] Because it is a question of the possibility of the sale of land and real estate, do you consider that both the present and the former parliaments feared a situation in which half of Bulgaria could have been bought with Turkish capital and through surrogates?

[Livadas] That is precisely what I had in mind when I said that each individual case should be considered separately.

[Deliyski] But that means the passing of double legislation. The same problem exists in Greece; how did you solve it there?

[Livadas] In Greece, anyone can buy land. An exception is made of the border areas, which are defined by a line and where land sales are prohibited. I just had an idea: Why not allow investors belonging to the EC to purchase land in your country? Or, what about appointing a special commission that would grant or deny the right to purchase land?

[Deliyski] According to the Greek press, the configuration of our parliament, particularly the presence of the DPS [Movement for Rights and Freedoms] in it, has dampened the desire of many of your businessmen to invest in our country.

[Livadas] That is true. That situation exists, but it should not.

[Deliyski] The organizers of the forthcoming Bulgarian-Greek business meeting are among the promoters of the idea that Greece should become one of the gates leading to the EC. In your view, how would Bulgarian and Greek businessmen benefit from participating in that meeting?

[Livadas] I believe, without any reservations, that such a meeting would be exceptionally useful. I intend to participate, and I expect specific results. At present, the biggest thing that keeps our cooperation from strengthening is the lack of specific information. Once the Bulgarians have clearly understood what they could accomplish with the Greeks, and after the Greeks have been given precise and competent information on the available possibilities—let us say in the creation of joint enterprises—I think there will be a Greek investment boom in Bulgaria. I, personally, am very optimistic, and I am working for this with a great deal of desire, love, and friendship. If you asked me why, I would be unable to tell you, but it is the truth.

### Automotive Transportation, Services Analyzed

92BA0361A Sofia BULGARSKI BIZNES in Bulgarian  
2 Dec 91 pp 1, 3

[Article by Evelina Nikiforova: "The Real Automotive Service Is Only in Its Embryonic Stage"]

[Text] The liberalization of the market for automotive services in Bulgaria is taking place quite rapidly, perhaps faster than in the other East European countries. The result has been a fast increase in the number of agents on the market. At present, we have more than 20,000 private (one person or group) and 70 state automotive companies (the latter based on the former okrug automotive enterprises).

However, we cannot claim that we have already developed a market for automotive services in the country. The precise diagnosis of the current situation is that we are establishing a market.

The market for international automotive services is a very important part of this market. The Association of Bulgarian Enterprises for International Transports and Roads takes an active part in its development. It is worth noting that it was created as early as 1962. However, it was only in 1989 that its membership began to grow rapidly and, naturally, so did the establishment of its reputation in business. (As in other similar cases, some forms borrowed from developed economies can be used on the market only now, while we are operating under real economic conditions.) The number of members of the ABPMPP [Association of Bulgarian Enterprises for International Transport and Roads] was about 30 in 1989, whereas now it exceeds 1,000. More than 90 percent of them are private firms. Of late, requests for membership have been averaging at the rate of five companies per day. The association is nonprofit. It is supported mainly from the sale of TIR ticket books and membership dues. Its activities are varied and are particularly useful in providing information concerning markets, the supply and demand of services, and the conditions for transport to foreign countries. It maintains valuable traditional contacts with the International Association of Automotive Haulers and other international organizations in this sector. In practice, the association currently is trying to also play the role of transportation exchange on the market for international automotive services in the country. There also is an Association of Private Automotive Haulers.

Despite such encouraging facts related to the international transportation economy of the country, the market remains a haulers market—that is, it is not competitive, and we do not find in it a real clash of interests among haulers, shippers, and customers. What are the most typical features of the market for international automotive services in our country?

First, it remains a monopoly.

On the one hand, there is SOMAT [International Automotive Transportation Economic Association], with 4,000 trucks (although a high percentage of them are quite obsolete); on the other, we currently have new and mostly small private firms. In Europe, the average transportation company operates between 80 and 100 motor vehicles for international haulage. In our country, it would be difficult to determine an average number of vehicles per company for lack of sufficiently reliable information. In most cases, however, they range between one or two and 10. Second in terms of size of the fleet, SOMAT is followed by KOMKO, a Bulgarian-Austrian company, which has more than 120 motor vehicles for international haulage. Only 14 of these are specialized (two container haulers and 12 refrigerated trucks). The Plovdiv TRANSEKSPRES company has a substantial fleet. (However, its specialized motor vehicles, as well, are few: It has only three refrigerated trucks, 14 tank trucks, and three livestock carriers.) The former okrug automotive enterprises, which are now state firms, also have a larger fleet of vehicles. However, the age and quality features of the vehicles are not particularly competitive. The private companies, for the time being, have smaller but modern vehicle fleets. Market conditions, as a whole, are dictated by SOMAT. Although they do not advertise it, all automotive companies charge rates similar to those charged by SOMAT, or about \$1 per km.

A monopoly market is always damaging to the consumers (in this case, the customers). However, this situation could change only gradually, as the companies become larger and stronger, as well as following either the bankruptcy or the absorption of small and weak companies by others, which is natural for a market-oriented economy but, naturally, within the framework of the Law on the Protection of Competition. If the market situation is one of monopoly and this monopoly cannot be eliminated (if such an elimination would harm the interests of the state, according to SOMAT), ways exist, known in world practice, on how to limit this monopoly: The state could "control the competition" by determining the amounts (or ceiling) of the rates of the services offered by the monopoly enterprise. In any case, considering the unstable economic situation that currently prevails in the world, as well the system of liberalization of services and absence of state support, it would be difficult to expect that huge enterprise would remain competitive on the international market (particularly while observing the stipulations of the Law on the Protection of Competition, which would restrict its activities on the national market). It is worth noting that state companies are more likely to behave as monopolies. For example, they are less willing to provide information on their fleets, their rates, and their activities.

Second, there are no clearly delineated niches or sectors with precise demarcation among companies that operate in each of these niches. The companies still have no network covering the entire country, such as to meet the needs of shippers or producers. There also is an absence

of structures and networks for electronic exchanges and the transfer of information concerning the possibilities, rates, and hauling conditions of our hauling companies, something that is normal for a market economy; and about conditions governing haulage to Europe, and so on. Consequently, we currently have a very high number of producer companies that haul their own goods (the so-called departmental transportation), thus being insured against the lack of transport facilities or suitable services whenever they need them. In practical terms, we have no specialized automotive companies. However, this is a natural process that will gradually crystallize. All we can hope for is that it will be completed quite soon. For the time being, this market feature is adverse but not fatal, essentially because the economy is in a state of crisis, and the freight flows have not been established and are even chaotic (anything that can be exported is being exported, and the firms export anything about which they can reach an agreement). Let me describe, for the sake of comparison, the shape of the market for international automotive services in the Netherlands, which is perhaps the country with the most open economy and the most developed transportation system in the world. The Netherlands has over 2,500 transportation companies engaged in international haulage. Their registered names and addresses are kept in a special register of Dutch international automotive haulers. The firms are classified into four sections. The first and main section includes an alphabetical list of all companies and their addresses. The second section provides a breakdown of the companies based on their specializations. The sectors are numerous and, naturally, reflect the structure of Dutch trade (for example, the hauling of containers, foodstuffs, flowers, steel items, automobiles, computers, machinery, carpets, and many others). A third section lists companies that provide specific services such as, for instance, in the area of material supplies (the so-called physical distribution), warehouse-to-warehouse supplies, customs formalities, and so forth. The fourth section lists companies by the country and area they service.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize a few things:

At present, the Association of Bulgarian Enterprises for International Automotive Transport and Roads and the Association of Private Automotive Vehicle Haulers play a very important role in the process of developing the market for automotive services in our country and also act as a kind of "transportation exchange," which brings customers together with haulers and shippers. Furthermore, they provide varied and very necessary information to their members, thus preparing them for operations abroad. Let me point out, however, that a high percentage of Bulgarian automotive companies are insufficiently familiar with the requirements of the EC, requirements that will become effective with the introduction of the unified transportation market as of 1 January 1993. Furthermore, this is a very dynamic market that is constantly changing conditions. Here are the latest examples: Following the signing of the agreement between the EC and EFTA [European Free Trade

Association] on the creation of a European economic area, Austria will increase the number of permits granted for crossing its territory by Greek trucks (which, in the future, could affect our own international trade); recently, Czechoslovakia banned the travel of trucks on its roads during days of rest.

On the market for international automotive services, we still have few Bulgarian shipping companies that are viewed as essential players in that market.

There is an obvious need for the development of a transportation exchange that would bring together automotive companies—haulers, customers, and shippers. A plan for its creation has already been drafted by the Center for Transportation Cybernetics of the Ministry of Transport and the Institute for Comprehensive Studies in Transportation. We are also expecting the first Register of International Automotive Haulers in Bulgaria.

### Modernizing, Privatizing Telecommunications

92BA0365A Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 17 Dec 91 p 6

[Article by Krasimir Tsigularov: "Bulgarian Telecommunications Attempt To Overtake the Developed Countries"—first paragraph is DUMA introduction]

[Text] During 1994, changes in the intercity and international telephone system will begin to appear obvious if matters concerning the four projects proposed by the Bulgarian side for financing by international institutes progress normally, contends Stefan Kolev, chief specialist on the Committee on Communications and Information. The mobile cellular system, which makes it possible to talk from an automobile in every spot in the country and abroad, may be developed more quickly. To begin working, however, the system must have at least 1,000 subscribers in the initial stage, to be increased by another 1,000 each following year for five years. These subscribers would have to generate revenues from approximately \$1,500 per year; the price of the terminal system itself is at present also about \$1,500.

Bulgaria received 3 million economic units from the EC under the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] program especially for telecommunications. They are being used exclusively to help in preparations for our technical projects to apply for credits before international financial institutions. These credits, for their part, will finance development of the system in such a way that, afterwards, the system will be in a condition to be paid off and to develop. Possible creditors have emerged—the European Investment Bank, the World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development have shown an obvious interest in Bulgarian telecommunications. The search for other sources, however, is not out of the question.

Development of a normal communications infrastructure is among the urgent tasks of the economic reform.



Analyses by Western experts invariably point to precisely telecommunications as an area for special attention, in which investments as well would be active more quickly. The stabilization of connections, for its part, would to a degree control the sluggishness of the banking system and the feeling of isolation from the civilized world.

Bulgaria is not fatally behind in quantity of communications, says Stefan Kolev. There are even countries in the EC, such as Portugal, that are behind us. But that is a deceptive quantity because the national automated telephone system includes barely 170 populated areas. The services the system offers are all those that can be provided with technology whose concept was designed in 1929. Certain improvements, including optical connections between stations, are neutralized by the technology, antiquated both morally and physically. An additional service is the first system among the former socialist countries for transferring information—"Bulpak". The radio and television system covers the country normally, and it is as if that is the only reassurance for the future.

From here on begins the great lack: cellular mobile systems, quality links for fax machines and computers, systems for personal calls, links to reliably transfer information in high volume and at high speed—all things that are a normal and inalienable part of everyday business around the world.

The four projects that will be presented first to the banks are: an intercity and international transit system; an initial stage in building a cellular system for mobile links for Sofia, Plovdiv and the highway between them; renovation of the system for transferring information; and development of the INFOTEL system. Before that occurs, they must be financially evaluated by the experts, the technical specifications for the equipment must be

prepared, and the auctions must be announced for the executors. All of this will not be completed before one year, after which comes the time to carry out the projects themselves. Two parallel missions within the framework of the PHARE program—for technical-economic analysis and for institutional reform—are currently operating in Bulgaria, and the opening of a permanent mission is planned, which will act to assist and advise in everyday problems. The auction for consulting firms of a technical nature was organized by the European Investment Bank, which once again hints that communications are firmly among the priorities of possible creditors.

A complete modernization of the internal communication system can hardly be expected in a short time. Repayment for one station under present conditions would take more than 20 years, and no one would invest in such a project. Eleven digital stations are projected, each having telephones that will be offered to sufficiently solvent subscribers, with a wide range of services.

Privatizing communications is not the answer, Stefan Kolev feels. The banks do not lay down such terms. The European practice is similar: With the exception of England, in all of the remaining countries, the state has a monopoly on the infrastructure and on telephone services.

It appears that the four communication projects are among the first to have a real chance of receiving a share of the widely proclaimed support for economic reform in Bulgaria. They have been ready for several years and have born the shackles characteristic of a planned economy—without researching consumer demand and with a high degree of abstract financial-economic reasoning. Now they must be translated into the language of a realistic market economy. Only after that can we hope that, with time, our country will cease to be ill-favored simply because of a lack of normal links.

### **Carnogusky's Ambiguity About Common State Noticed**

*92CH0311A Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK  
in Slovak 16 Jan 92 p 2*

[Article by Andrej Javorsky: "Czecho-Slovak State-Forming Games"]

[Text] Those who pay careful attention to the statements and positions of Slovak Prime Minister Carnogursky on the state setup of Czechoslovakia could well become—to put it mildly—perplexed. Many of our fellow citizens as well as politicians, especially those with a national orientation or those who plan on playing the national (or even the nationalistic) card, are still hoping that the prime minister of the Slovak Republic and the chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH], combined in one person, is playing political poker, at the end of which, after being forgiven for some of the interludes, he will "go for broke" for the final victory.

However, the present KDH chairman, and it can be expected that he will remain so until the elections, is not one of those politicians who stake everything on one card all at once. In spite of that, some of his statements on the future "historic" fate of the CSFR are reminiscent of the tactics of a professional gambler who stubbornly bets on his own trumps. But, anyone trying to catch Jan Carnogursky in the act is more likely get in trouble himself before he can take him to task. The whole trick is that in spite of the outward impression, he basically holds to his stance on the state setup. Above all on the point that the Slovak Republic is, from the viewpoint of international law and especially the viewpoint of the current developments in East Europe, a state in its own right.

Even the day before yesterday, at the meeting with journalists during the deliberations of the government of the Slovak Republic, Jan Carnogursky insisted that an eventual treaty between the Czech and Slovak Republics would be, one way or the other, a state treaty, because according to constitutional law the republics are in fact states. During the discussions of the coalition representatives of the Slovak National Council [SNR] and the Czech National Council [CNR], Peter Tatar, member of the presidium of the Slovak Parliament for the Civic Democratic Union-Public Against Violence [ODU-VPN], stated quite frankly—and at the same time also constructively—that if the Slovak representatives (obviously also under pressure to compromise in the interest of coalition unity) give up the designation "state treaty," they do so to make it possible for the common state to function well. But it seems that for the shrewd lawyer, who indisputably cannot ignore the strong pressure from the KDH on behalf of Slovak statehood—even if not a separatist one—it is not enough. And so Jan Carnogursky challenged even the proposed compromise of the author of this commentary to call the treaty in question constitutional.

"State treaty or constitutional treaty—that is basically the same thing," opines the KDH chairman, citing the

vague grammatical distinction of the term constitutional treaty. Several arguments could certainly be found to refute Jan Carnogursky's assertion, and he could be accused of legal acrobatics. But more impressive is the rather more optimistic attitude of Frantisek Miklosko, chairman of the Slovak National Council, that the positions of the Czech and Slovak parliamentarians on the constitution are getting closer in their final outcome, even in spite of some persisting disagreements. The number one man in Slovakia, who is said to be closer to KDH than to ODU-VPN (according to his party affiliation in the elections) is maybe thus saving not only his own but also the Slovak face.

To speak today among ordinary people about the Civic Democratic Union—or the former Public Against Violence—as a positive element in the constitutional efforts in behalf of a common Czechoslovak state, practically means to commit civic suicide. But SNR Chairman Frantisek Miklosko stated that he will not betray the VPN. Certainly he must have had in mind the ideals which, after all, have brought the VPN and the KDH into a coalition. And that is always a better combination than the unpredictable "national" triumvirate of Movement for Democratic Slovakia-Slovak National Party-Party of Democratic Left [HZDS-SNS-SDL]. Therefore, in the end, in the constitutional and preelection considerations, the thus far unverified "When three are fighting among themselves, two are going to be the winners" could apply.

### **Soldiers Propose Autonomous Slovak Army**

*92CH0311B Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK  
in Slovak 24 Jan 92 p 3*

[Article by Peter Svec: "A Federal State Needs a Federated Army"]

[Text] In drafting the Constitution of the Slovak Republic [SR] it is also necessary to take into consideration one of the attributes of statehood, namely, defense capability. If the published proposals ignore this factor, it could be because of lack of knowledge. On 22 December a seminar of professional soldiers stationed in Slovakia took place in Poprad on the topic "Common defense does not mean unitary defense." Many interesting ideas and suggestions were heard there, and they could contribute to the discussions on the SR constitution, because a considerable number of the soldiers active in Slovakia stand behind them. The publication of some of the ideas that came out of the seminar will certainly be of interest to our readers.

Most of the soldiers in Slovakia realize that CSFR, in spite of its proclaimed federal structure, has the army of a unitary state. We are becoming the last Eastern bloc country that is retaining the Bolshevik-Stalinist precepts of an army of a multinational state. The steps being taken by the leadership of the Czechoslovak Army give rise to suspicions that the intention is to preserve the



until recently valid Brezhnev military doctrine based on the principle of limited sovereignty of the states of the erstwhile Warsaw Pact.

Until now, it has been possible to resolve the joint defense of several nations equitably only on the coalition principle, and the security of a region is guaranteed only where there is a sufficient military deterrent potential. No small and somewhat weak nation ever attacks, it does not pose the threat of aggression as long as it is not in tow of a great power and its interests. As the basis of the constitutional principles of defense capability we can use the Kosice government program and the defense powers which it guarantees to the national agencies. It requires the adoption of a purely SR constitution that includes defense powers; subsequently some of the powers can be turned over to a supranational agency while maintaining constitutional, legal, and other guarantees against misuse of the army. The basic philosophy and the principles of restructuring the army can be summarized as follows:

1. A solution must be found that will remove the causes of today's undemocratic situation, that will be permanent and not temporary or even extortionist. The basic criterion: a two-republic army, or in other words, an army of two statehoods.

2. The precepts used in structuring the army cannot be based either on Czechoslovakism or on Stalinism; a joint defense cannot put national subjects at a disadvantage. One-nation union states or federal states such as the FRG or the United States cannot serve as models for us for the structuring.

3. Defense capability depends more on the arms structure and complexity of all kinds of troops rather than on numbers. Therefore the deployment of both attack and defense weapons, even as regards quality, must be equitable on the territories of both republics. That would remove charges of discrimination and of paying more than a fair share, and as a result the defense capability of the CSFR would be enhanced. National agencies must have sufficient say in decisions concerning the structure of the troops.

4. Plans do not guarantee defense capability or deterrence. Therefore we cannot be interested in what is being planned for the distant future, but in what is here today and what will be here tomorrow. Plans can be quickly cancelled. The trust between nations is based on commensurate defense capability, and joint armies in the hands of a hegemonic authority have all been misused at least once.

5. The guarantees against the possibility of misusing the army must be provided regardless of election victories and regardless of the state setup. Therefore, the division of powers between the supranational and national agencies is important, with effective control of the army on the part of the Slovak National Council.

6. Strategic interests are always national. Jointly administered should be only that which is to the advantage of the individual national constituent part. Even small Denmark uses NATO to protect its strategic interests where it does not have its own means, or where it is more effective to do so. It retains the right of control and of secession from the treaty.

7. A small nation can have an army of only a defensive nature, where the main principle of the military-strategic doctrine rests in the determination of the nation to defend its sovereignty. In this context, the joint defense must not make possible the concentration of operational weapons on a small area of one of the republics, which would be a source of potential distrust on the part of neighboring states. Collective European security is not threatened by the fact that armies of small nations are becoming independent, but rather by the instability of multinational iniquitous states that could become potential focal points of tensions and conflicts.

8. So far, mankind has known unitary, coalition, provincial, and intervention armies. The basic principle of our joint defense must be a dual coalition principle. This approach is downright demanded by the geographic situation of the CSFR. Here national armies in fact exist, the only issue is their disposition and making certain that Slovakia does not end up with only a provincial (in its structure) army as a result of decision being made outside its agencies.

9. As a matter of principle, each nation must provide the financing for its own defense. The argument that power sharing will result in increased financial costs has no merit whatsoever. The unnecessary centralized federal agencies would cost much less, the command structure would be more flexible, overhead costs would be much lower, and, most of all, there would be more trust. Considering the fiscal policy in the CSFR and the proportionate costs of the army in Slovakia (very low), Slovakia is not only paying for the reconfiguration out of its own pocket, but it also subsidizes to a great extent the army on the territory of the Czech Republic. A national guard under national administration is merely the minimum which Slovakia can and must demand. Even in the former USSR, while the common army still existed, they made it possible for the national republics to build their own national guards....

**Goncz, Justice Minister Differ on Legal Appeal***92CH0302C Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
11 Jan 92 p 1*

[Article by S.A.: "Appeals for Clemency Must Be Countersigned; What Will Be the Fate of the Mutineers of Torokbalint?"]

[Text] In the past few days we have learned that the president of the Republic and the justice minister are at odds over a clemency appeal submitted by the mutinying conscripts of Torokbalint.

As we reported in Friday's issue, Justice Minister Istvan Balsai had forwarded the clemency plea of the "mutinying" conscripts, all of who are currently serving their sentences, to the president of the Republic, noting that he did not intend to make a motion in support of their plea. Two days later, however, Head of State Arpad Goncz announced in a radio interview that he would sign the appeal, asserting that the soldiers have already been punished enough for what they had done.

The Constitution and the position of the Constitutional Court provides clear guidance in this case, we have been told unanimously by the legal experts we have approached. Although according to the Constitution currently in place it is indeed the president of the Republic who has the right to grant clemency in individual cases, his decision must be countersigned by the justice minister. Moreover, the Constitutional Court's decision concerning the scope of presidential authority makes it clear: "The countersignature is necessary to validate the act of the president of the Republic." In other words, without the minister's countersignature the presidential pardon is invalid. Which, of course, does not exclude the possibility of an eventual compromise in this particular case.

**MDF National Congress Delegates Interviewed***92CH0287B Budapest BESZELO in Hungarian  
21 Dec 91 pp 7-9*

[Interviews with Istvan Elek, Zoltan Szokolay, Sandor Lezsak, and Istvan Csurka, delegates to the Hungarian Democratic Forum's national congress, by Upor in Budapest on the second day of the congress: "Profiles and Struggles Within the Hungarian Democratic Forum"—first paragraph is BESZELO introduction]

[Text] Just as we did last year, we visited also this year the national congress of the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] to interview a few of that party's personalities who can be said to be prominent. To tell the truth, this reporter had not expected such manly self-assurance of tranquil power, and during the two days he often felt like a pygmy among white men. He recovered from his amazement only toward the end of the second day. That was when the following interviews were conducted.

**1. Istvan Elek, Leader of the One-Time 'Rebels':****'We All Are Floored'**

[Upor] Many people are saying that, since the departure of Kata Beke, the MDF has begun to live up even the remnants of its moral capital. What is your opinion about this?

[Elek] I would be preparing a very poor testimonial about myself and my associates if I were to agree. Therefore I do not agree with that statement. I am sorry that Kata Beke has left. Regrettably, she lost her patience. In this matter she has not acted as a politician, in my opinion.

[Upor] Yesterday, on the first day of the congress, the MDF seemed united, at least up there on the dais. Do you, too, feel that the party is so united?

[Elek] When the leaders of a party deliver an opening address at the party's national congress, it is only natural that they speak about the things that unite us, rather than about the problems that separate us from one another. But it is obvious that the entire organization is not so united as would appear from the introductory speech. These very great differences—of mentality, style and social status—are natural within a populist formation. What would have been strange is if the parlance of politics had failed to reflect how many different kinds of people, formations and interest have come together here.

[Upor] To an outsider it nevertheless seems that, from among the three orientations within the party, the populist-national one has decisively gained strength since the party's previous national congress, and in recent months in particular.

[Elek] That orientation launched very many spectacular campaigns, and it articulates the most strongly the dissatisfaction of a proportion of our membership with the changes. But this does not mean that there has been a significant realignment of intellectual strength and political views.

[Upor] The contention has been voiced that the MDF's original program has practically been realized, and therefore a new program has to be framed.

[Elek] In his speech yesterday, Tamas Szabo quoted from the proceedings of a county meeting a sentence claiming that 90 percent of the program has been realized. Responding to that claim, he said that there should be a new program if the claim was true. But the quoted sentence is obviously false, merely a high-sounding contention. Of course, many things have been realized. After all, like the programs of every opposition party, ours too contained general democratic demands. But many things have not been realized. One could ponder, of course, whether 2.5 years before the next elections it would be timely to come out with an ambition to prepare for the next elections and to begin a new course. In any event, it is warranted for us to face the facts and determine what we have not been able to accomplish; as a result of that

introspection, we could use the time until the next elections to correct our policies.

[Upor] What are you dissatisfied with? What has not been accomplished to date?

[Elek] In many respects the MDF has departed from the style of politics it formulated in its program in the autumn of 1989. Of course, we could speak also of the various areas. Kata Beke is right, we do have great lags in education. Also in the economy we should face the fact that certain expectations have not materialized and some conditions have changed to our disadvantage. Very little has been realized of our truly great undertaking to broaden the stratum of national middle-class proprietors, by enabling hundreds of thousands to become entrepreneurs and giving them loans on favorable terms for that purpose, so that a large mass of people who previously had no chance of becoming middle-class could join the process of embourgeoisement.

[Upor] As one of the leaders of the "rebel lot," how comfortable are you now in the MDF?

[Elek] I dislike the term "rebel" and that, I believe, is only natural. As I have already explained on other occasions, I feel ill at ease within the MDF. Others are feeling ill at ease for other reasons. Everyone is feeling ill at ease. Intellectually and physically, we are floored. (But perhaps that can be said also of the other political parties' deputies; they have such burdens to bear.) I see that my own political views, preferences, mentality and values can be asserted only through hard struggle, if at all. Not only I but other like-minded people as well should be speaking out more forcefully, effectively and frequently to have any chance of convincing the party's membership that the political style, methods and tactics we are advocating would better serve the realization of also their interests and concepts.

## 2. Zoltan Szokolay, Father of the General Will Association:

### 'We Merely Request'

[Upor] At the organization meeting of the General Will Association it was also said, among other things, that the "infantry" would come to restore order at Hungarian Television, some people would be tossed out from the top floor, etc. Don't you think that you, as a deputy of the National Assembly, ought to distance yourself from such statements?

[Szokolay] Such an extremist view was expressed also at the fifth national congress of the MDF. As it was subsequently established, the speaker had not been a delegate or even a member of the Hungarian Democratic Forum. I can say the same thing about the gentleman at the General Will Association's meeting who talked about calling out the infantry. We subsequently checked the applications for admission and established that he had neither applied for membership nor had signed a declaration. The only interpretation I am able to attach to this

whole affair—and the association's elected provisional presidium fully agrees with me—is that this is some sort of provocation or at least an extreme manifestation that must be managed. We regard specifically the opportunity to say such things under civilized conditions as one of the most important areas of the association's activity. Wherever local groups have been formed during the 1.5 months since the meeting, such extremists have already been excluded. Most of the responses we are receiving are of a cultural nature. To cite merely one example, some thirty people signed a letter requesting out help in achieving that Hungarian Radio include more folk music in its programming.

[Upor] What is the General Will Association's objective?

[Szokolay] To represent the interests of newspaper readers, radio listeners and television viewers. We would like to persuade several papers to offer a broader forum for readers, to organize more frequent meetings between journalists and their readership, to enable even sharply divided debating partners to sit down at the same table. For instance, I did not find even the Konya-Peto debate so terrible. Such debates are necessary, but the audience at any debate must learn to behave in a civilized manner.

We would like to play also a legal, interest-representing role. Although there are about ten journalists among us, we wish to become the interest group of the readership rather than of the journalistic profession.

[Upor] What tools are available to you for the realization of your goals?

[Szokolay] For the time being, we have no tools at all. By which I mean that we have no money whatsoever. We are attempting to establish our minimal base partially from donations.

[Upor] How can a journal be persuaded to publish more letters from readers, for instance?

[Szokolay] We merely request, and then that either works or does not. Also because of the events at our organization meeting, regrettably, we have been boxed in too closely with the government. Only PESTI HIRLAP and UJ MAGYARORSZAG have turned to us openly and with good will. We would not like this to stay that way.

[Upor] The ruling parties have often been saying that the opposition's views are those of an insignificant minority. Why do you think that whatever opinion emerges within your association is truly the general will, rather than just the will of one stratum?

[Szokolay] Oh, we are still very far from that. This association would be able to live up to its name only if it were truly able to cause different opinions to clash. Affiliation with some political party is not typical of an overwhelming majority of the association's members. We have not even asked them about their party affiliation.

[Upor] In sum, do you regard the association's name as apt?

[Szokolay] Indeed, I have not yet said anything about that. No, for the time being. The association's name was not my idea.

[Upor] If I would want to join the General Will Association because, in my opinion, TV Newsreel is not impartial at present but it biased in favor of the government, and that is harmful for the dissemination of information, could I become a member of the association with such views?

[Szokolay] You would not be disqualified. There is nothing in the bylaws which says that a person can be barred from the association because of his opinions or political views.

[Upor] Since the association, whether it likes it or not, is regarded as an initiative of the ruling parties, don't you think that libraries and cultural centers are offering you the use of their premises simply because they are afraid, and not because of their convictions?

[Szokolay] If I were a librarian, I would welcome any program that induces people to walk in. Most of the people who join our association want national culture and programs that are less immoral; that much is true of the ruling parties' sponsorship. Even if I do not agree entirely with such demands, I have to accept that such a stratum also exists within the public.

[Upor] Allow me to ask you whether you did or did not press your fellow Deputy Zoltan Varga's button during voting in Parliament the other day?

[Szokolay] I don't know. During voting, in conjunction with the interpretation of some previous questions, an argument erupted among several deputies in my immediate vicinity. I too had voted with the opposition on several questions, because that is what my conscience dictated. On some question, specifically on Jozsef Szaizer's motion to amend if I recall correctly, Zoli Varga jumped up from his seat, pressed the button while still standing, and then left the chamber. I transferred some of my stuff to his desk and continued to make notes there. It was my fault if, after Zoli's departure, the machine recorded another vote [from his desk]. But I cannot be accused of cheating deliberately. I personally would welcome if this investigation were to run its course and determine unambiguously what actually happened. To me the freely elected parliament's reputation is more important than even my seat.

### 3. Sandor Lezsak, the Great Returner:

#### 'Section III of Department III'

[Upor] Mr. Lezsak, PESTI HIRLAP in its 5 December issue published a reprint of a statement of yours that appeared originally in the Australian newspaper MAGYAR ELET. In it you claim that a part of the lists of agents working for Section III of Department III was

either destroyed or sent for safekeeping to the Crimean Peninsula, but another part "was hidden at home and is in our possession." How should one interpret this?

[Lezsak] In 1989-90 I was executive vice president of the MDF. At that time we lived to see not only the infirm old age of the Kadar era, but also the disintegration and confusion of a part of Section III within Department III. Very many people came then to me as executive vice president of the MDF. Some were provocateurs. Others were unbalanced members of the network who had suffered nervous breakdowns under the burden of their responsibility. I was sought out also by persons who simply infiltrated the MDF at the time of its formation. Well, these people tried to prove their importance by giving me the extensive lists and rolls I mentioned in that article. After the elections, obviously, neither I nor anyone else could have access to those lists. In other words, that was an experience of an earlier period. MAGYAR ELET had omitted that fact from its introduction. Consequently, you are entirely right about that being misleading.

[Upor] According to the article, you said that the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] and FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats] had proposed keeping the lists sealed for 99 years. On what did you base this supposition?

[Lezsak] I have just received a letter from the SZDSZ press office asking me that same question. It would not be fair to answer that question to a newspaper before answering them.

[Upor] You also said that these matters must be investigated, but not by lawyers of the Kadar era. As you put it, "we are unable to find a sufficient number of reliable lawyers."

[Lezsak] Yes. This again is not entirely clear in the given wording. That is the danger of writing articles by lifting passages from an introduction. I was responding to a specific question, which arose when somebody could not find a suitable forum to hear his case, because he did not trust lawyers. To which my answer was: Yes, that uncertainty could be experienced even today. Here we have a crisis of confidence in the legal fraternity. To resolve and abate that crisis, on the one hand the older generation of lawyers must furnish proof; and on the other hand there is the influx of young lawyers and attorneys.

[Upor] Since in the cited article you also said that the authenticity of the lists in your possession cannot be determined, what do you think should be the solution in the case of agents who had worked for Section III of Department III?

[Lezsak] I think—and this is merely my personal opinion; the leaders of other parties may be seeing these things differently—that if the Hungarian Government declares, in the course of implementing a statute, that the list is reliable, then it is reliable. Of course, the responsibility involved is enormous.

[Upor] If it turns out that there are former agents also within the MDF, what standpoint will you adopt as one of the party's vice presidents? Would you expel them?

[Lezsak] The answer is clear. The law applies to everyone. And we will have a viable rule-of-law state only when this question and such suspicions do not even arise.

#### **4. Istvan Csurka, Chief Ideologist of 'Permanent Revolution':**

##### **'What Makes You Think It Would Be So Difficult?'**

[Upor] In your speech yesterday, in which you gave a kind of assessment of the economy, you spoke among other things also about attempts to preserve power and assets. By what means does the MDF intend to forestall such attempts?

[Csurka] Well, to begin with, an enormous amount of information is available. After all, MDF members and organizations have suffered very many grievances. These organizations are in possession of accurate information regarding various attempts to transfer assets by trickery; or if they do not yet have such information, they will gather it. The information will then trigger accurate actions, processes of rendering accurate accounts, which hopefully will result in the assets being returned to where they rightfully belong, by the individuals, institutions, and newly formed or existing limited-liability companies that obtained the assets actually without any valid legal basis.

[Upor] Pursuant to the statutory regulations now in force, that will not be so easy. Do you think it will be necessary to enact also new laws?

[Csurka] There obviously are also fortunes that arose by circumventing the statutory regulations now in force and by taking advantage of loopholes in the laws. And there are fortunes that are protected by the statutory regulations that are in force. They are protected as long as these statutory regulations, some of them enacted at the time of the party-state, remain in force. Therefore it is obvious that creating order must begin with rescinding or amending the laws and decree that are unsuitable, have becoming outdated, and so on.

[Upor] As you said, information is available. Are you planning to make that information public?

[Csurka] Obviously, that too will happen from time to time.

[Upor] In what form?

[Csurka] Unfortunately, I see the possibility of that ensured only on a limited scale. For even if we include BESZELO, the likelihood of our being able to match the volume and circulation of the papers in the pay of the party-state is very slight.

[Upor] In your speech yesterday you mentioned that it is necessary to examine also in the case of ministry

employees whether they have been aiding the change of political systems during the past 18 months. On the basis of what criteria would that investigation take place?

[Csurka] What makes you think that would be so difficult? If some people hampered efforts or slowed them down, set aside the work they were assigned or did not attend to it the way statutory regulations or their duties require, then it will be very easy to apprehend such persons. I do not foresee any difficulty in doing so. The machinery will eject the impeters.

[Upor] In your speech you also said—and I am now paraphrasing you a bit more bluntly than the language you used—that also the opposition shares the blame for hijacking and sabotaging the change of political systems. Did I understand you correctly?

[Csurka] You have. First of all, the opposition had, did it not, enormous press support which it used to embarrass those who were struggling to change the political system. And then also some members of the opposition are in the government machinery, in the structure of institutions. Of course they are.

[Upor] What you are saying presupposes that on one side there are the forces "for changing the political system," the parties of the ruling coalition; and on the other side there are the impeters, the opposition, for instance.

[Csurka] You said that, not I.

[Upor] But that is what you meant?

[Csurka] My opinion is similar. Evidently the opposition will now feel offended by my audacity to doubt that it, too, wants a change of political systems. But these are merely words. The facts tell us something else. The facts show that the opposition consistently rejected or obstructed the laws serving to change the political system, or made their enactment difficult, etc.

[Upor] In your opinion, is the opposition a political opponent or an enemy?

[Csurka] Naturally, the opposition is and will remain a political opponent.

[Upor] Yesterday Istvan Balas circulated a list at the meeting of one of the sections. You have frequently expressed the opinion that one way of preserving power has been to leave henchmen of the old party-state in important positions or to assign them to such positions. That list shows exactly that people who held office also under the party-state are now in very important positions, often in the prime minister's immediate entourage. On the basis of what criteria will you determine that these officials do not belong among those who are attempting to preserve power?

[Csurka] This is something you should not be asking me, because I have rejected that list. I regard the list as outrageous specifically because the compilation of such a list requires proof. The fact alone that someone had



belonged to the party during certain years is not enough proof to declare him a henchman of the party-state, because his activity might have served also a good cause. Such a list is only good for creating confusion.

[Upor] According to what you have just said, then, the MDF is not planning to launch an investigation on the basis of that list?

[Csurka] We will not launch investigations on the basis of lists! We never institute proceedings on the basis of lists, only on the basis of the law and the facts of each case.

[Upor] Thank you for the interviews.

### **Interior Minister on Changes in Citizenship Law**

92CH0302A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP  
in Hungarian 17 Jan 92 p 8

[Report by Katalin Karcagi: "Peter Boross Was Referring to the Option"]

[Text] According to Foreign Ministry sources, for now Hungary is not contemplating to grant Hungarian minorities living beyond its borders Hungarian citizenship, MAGYAR HIRLAP has been told by well-informed officials. It is a fact, however, that there have been statements made in the press, suggesting that following the German example we too should make it possible for repatriating members of Hungarian minorities to take up Hungarian citizenship.

(Article 116 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany defines as German anyone holding German citizenship; persons who as refugees, expelled members of the German brethren, their spouses or descendants have been allowed to settle within the 31 December 1937 borders of the former German Reich. Former German citizens who for political, racial or religious reasons were stripped of their citizenship between 30 January 1933 and 8 May 1945, and their descendants, must be returned their citizenship upon request.)

Last Friday—as it was revealed in Hungarian Radio's ESTI KRONIKA [Evening Chronicle] program—speaking before the mayors of Jasz-Nagykun-Szolnok county, Interior Minister Peter Boross discussed, among other things, the preparations behind the pending citizenship law. He expressed hope that within a few months they would have a law in place "that would make it easier for everyone born to a Hungarian mother to obtain Hungarian citizenship, while making it harder for those who were not." As he explained "since this is the homeland of the Hungarians it will now be possible for all Hungarians to be granted citizenship under preferential terms. Some are opposed to the idea, insisting that the Transylvanians should stay home because of the problems it will cause if they do not.

"It is true that if at all possible everyone should stay in his native land. But this government could not claim

moral legitimacy—and would directly violate its own principles—if it failed to recognize that Hungarians in Nagyvarad [Oradea] are entitled to the same rights as those living in Kecskemet. Consequently what we are seeing is the return of option rights similar to those enjoyed in the 1930's when it was very simple for people resettling here from the so-called annexed territories to become Hungarian citizens." The right of option referred to by the Interior Minister was stipulated in Article 63 of the Trianon Peace Treaty. According to that provision, persons 18 years of age or older who have lost their Hungarian citizenship and have taken up new ones in accordance with the postwar settlement would, within a year from the implementation of the peace treaty, have the right "to request citizenship of the state where they had claimed domicile prior to acquiring domicile in the annexed territories. The husband's option would apply to his wife, and the option chosen by the parents would apply to their children aged 18 or younger."

Asserting that the draft law was still in changing state, the Interior Ministry press office did not wish to comment on it, and stressed that Peter Boross' words were distortedly reported in Romania.

### **Constitutional Court Versus Supreme Court**

92CH0302B Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG  
in Hungarian 18 Jan 92 pp 76, 78

[Interview with Pal Solt, president of the Supreme Court, by Endre Babus; place and date not given: "Judge for Yourself; Supreme Court vs. Constitutional Court"]

[Text] The Constitutional Court has unearthed the hatchet against the Supreme Court. The "Council of Wise Men"—to everyone's surprise—carried out a virtual coup recently by overturning a legally binding judicial decision. In addition to commenting on the decision, which essentially amounts to a declaration of war, the president of the rival tribunal, the Supreme Court, Pal Solt also touched upon the protocol differences between the two chief justices.

[Babus] Since the Constitutional Court reversed a legally binding family law ruling in 1986, it is not easy to sort out who in Hungary has the authority to issue decisions in legal cases. Do you, as the number one man of the bench, intend to accept the decision of the "competition," or are you preparing to make a counter-move?

[Solt] I believe that the decision of the Constitutional Court is binding on everyone. Even in my capacity as president of the Supreme Court, I could not tell you otherwise. It is a whole different matter whether or not I see questionable elements in the decision you have mentioned. The other members of the Supreme Court were, admittedly, also rather perplexed by the decision. Several of them have questioned whether in fact there could be a clear-cut distinction drawn between the jurisdictions of the Constitutional Court which oversees the legislative process, on the one hand, and the courts, most notably the Supreme Court, which implement our



laws, on the other. I am not one of those, however, who consider this latest decision by the Constitutional Court to be an unqualified blunder. There have, for example, been strong reservations expressed about the case by one of the deputy state secretaries of the Justice Ministry, but I found his statement to the press to be too brief and laconic.

[Babus] How would you rate the verdict in question overall?

[Solt] This decision has given rise to some very serious concerns among family law experts. In effect, the Constitutional Court has reinstated an affiliation decision that had once been overturned in a legal action. Owing obviously to that body's elevated constitutional status, it has at the same time completely neglected to address such issues as court costs, which we "common justices" cannot simply ignore. Much more importantly, however, if the Constitutional Court claims to have the right to overturn a judicial verdict, one would at least expect the court to listen to all of the parties involved. For this is something it has failed to do. Essentially the decision as a whole amounts to a well-intentioned, albeit desperate attempt on the part of that body to render a judgement on a constitutional complaint. In my opinion, it takes extraordinary boldness for someone to interfere in a legally binding family law case that has stood for five years. Although it takes a well-stated and emphatic legal position, I consider the decision to be downright alarming, precisely because of its audacity. I wish to stress that I am not saying this because I feel offended in any way. I am prepared to acknowledge that when it comes to issues of legal interpretation the Constitutional Court is number one among equals. I say this in all sincerity, for in the final analysis the Constitutional Court has a perfect right to review laws and our entire legal code. The decision at hand which dealt basically with a break-in into another's apartment, purportedly to "rescue a child from the fire," I think was completely ill-conceived. The Constitutional Court acted as if there had been an extreme emergency. Despite the fact that the house was not even on fire or that there was nothing else to suggest such an emergency.

[Babus] The actual dilemma, I believe, can be very concisely stated. Do you not see a danger that styled as the third governing branch, the Constitutional Court will eventually place itself above the regular courts with these types of decisions?

[Solt] In 99 percent of the cases, the jurisdictions of the two institutions can be clearly separated. The case in question falls within a very narrow area of overlapping jurisdictions in which the powers of the two bodies are indeed pitted in rivalry. It is a constitutional complaint, grounds on which the Constitutional Court also has the right to select individual cases for review of certain decisions. According to the provisions of the constitution, the rules of such proceedings should be defined by

law, yet to this day the Constitutional Court has been operating without making the procedural rules it applies clear to the public.

[Babus] Frankly, I am surprised at the reassuring distinctions you have drawn between the powers of the two institutions in the majority of cases. After all, a precedent has been established on the basis of which the Constitutional Court can henceforth overturn any judicial decision—even after several years—by claiming that the verdict was unconstitutional. Are you not concerned about the looming danger of serious legal instability?

[Solt] There is no question that the Constitutional Court has moved in the wrong direction by handing down this decision. Given today's circumstances, I feel, it should limit itself to determining the constitutionality of court decisions; the odious task of nullifying verdicts is a dangerous one to undertake. At the same time, looking into the future, I think that once the Constitutional Court has made a determination of unconstitutionality after the fact, it should be possible to bring the case to a proper conclusion by way of special proceedings in the regular courts. This would also be in conformity with current European constitutional practice.

[Babus] The concerns raised in connection with this ominous decision also have to do with the fear that the Constitutional Court can arbitrarily dig up court decisions, going back several decades, and nullify them after the fact. Allow me to bring up the question of your personal responsibility in this connection, for at the time you were granted special powers by the Constitutional Courts you too were a member of that body.

[Solt] Constitutional law imposes a 60-day deadline on submitting constitutional complaints. When the Constitutional Court initially began to function, its first five members—I admittedly among them—decided that during the first two months of 1990, any old case could be brought before the Constitutional Court for review. I am strong enough to concede: This was a seriously ill-conceived decision. Fortunately not too many cases have come out of it.

[Babus] Who knows, of course, what else the Constitutional Court may have up its sleeves?

[Solt] To my knowledge there have been no more such submissions. The 60-day deadline, incidentally, should have obviously been interpreted to mean that anyone wanting to submit a case dating back more than 60 days prior to the forming of the Constitutional Court could no longer do so.

[Babus] What kind of division of labor has evolved in the "time-tested" democracies between constitutional and supreme courts?

[Solt] There are widely disparate models out there. Austrian laws state that the decisions of the supreme court are not subject to probing by the constitutional

court. The practice of several other European states, on the other hand, is just the opposite.

[Babus] Recently one of my colleagues noticed that at a conference abroad the President of the Hungarian Constitutional Court was accompanied by two bodyguards while you, attending the same meeting appeared, should I say, without "gorillas." This protocol distinction appears to suggest that, if only informally for the moment, the president of the Constitutional Court outranks the president of the Supreme Court. Are you not concerned that this, for now seemingly still harmless distinction will sooner or later lead to a different interpretation of the relative status of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court?

[Solt] The absence of bodyguards, thank goodness, is a fact. And as long as I am not compelled by real danger to do otherwise, I wish to keep things the way they are. Whether or not there can, in fact, be a distinction drawn between our respective constitutional positions is all the more difficult for me to answer since there is a close bond of sincere affection and warm friendship between the president of the Constitutional Court and me. Nothing could convince me that he was motivated by some inner need to outrank the president of the Supreme Court. At the same time I would readily admit that I am not too sensitive when it comes to matters of protocol, and from time to time people do take advantage of this.

[Babus] In a state system that is still evolving, differences between the powers of the two presidents could also affect the rights of the organizations which they head. And while according to a 1990 law the number one officials of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court are of equal status, this appears to be controverted also by facts other than the example already mentioned. Not long ago the daily press reported that besides the head of state and the prime minister, the president of the Constitutional Court is also provided a residence by the state. Also as unclear as the powers of the presidents is the hierarchical relationship between the two judicial bodies.

[Solt] I think there is some truth to that. As we all know, in the old regime there was no Constitutional Court, and the president of the Supreme Court was a rather moderately ranking constitutional player in the party state. He did have a permanent seat in parliament though; in fact, for a while he had the distinct honor of sitting behind Janos Kadar, although for reasons unclear, he was later replaced by the chief prosecutor. Under the new system, the protocol list issued by the Prime Minister's Office clearly lists five persons as belonging in the highest constitutional category: the president of the republic, the prime minister, the speaker of parliament, the president of the Constitutional Court, and the president of the Supreme Court. Without wandering too far off on this subject, I would just point out that this protocol has by no means solidified into a commonly held conviction within the state apparatus. The Foreign Ministry, for example, often sends me letters, addressing me as chief

prosecutor. I also do not get invited to all state functions, although I must admit I have not been fighting fiercely to change that. My court apparatus, however, would like me to be present at certain events. It is true that I do not have a state-provided residence; in fact, I keep the location of my home secret, not for security reasons as much as out of embarrassment.

[Babus] Are you not even applying for a state residence?

[Solt] I have taken no steps at all to explore this matter. I live in the same building, the same rental apartment where we lived when I was born 55 years ago. One very important benefit of this is that my private life has remained completely undisturbed. The staircase is in such dilapidated state that inviting anyone to visit there is out of the question.

### Views of Minister, Party on Tense Budget Debate

#### Kupa's Annoyance, Satisfaction

92CH0296A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP  
in Hungarian 2 Jan 92 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Finance Minister Mihaly Kupa in Budapest on 31 December 1991 by Zoltan Muzslai: "Interview With Mihaly Kupa"—first paragraph is MAGYAR HIRLAP introduction]

[Text] In the late afternoon of the last day of the year and in the wake of an almost 60-hour sleep deficit, Finance Minister Mihaly Kupa made statements to the MAGYAR HIRLAP in his study on Nador Square, in the aftermath of celebrating the budget that was finally approved by his colleagues and members of the government. The finance minister was frequently annoyed by the style of the parliamentary debate, but the fact that Hungary now has a 1992 budget gives him a sense of satisfaction. He assessed this as a fact that also increases personal prestige. Mihaly Kupa was confident that the state budget law would be passed in the first three months of the year. He did not make any promises regarding the time for presenting the next budget.

[Muzslai] Mr. Minister, despite your tiredness, it is apparent that you are happy about the passage of this law. Was there a moment during the debate when you thought that the budget was going to fall through?

[Kupa] Of course, I am happy that the country now has a budget, one that I did not inherit but rather was able to prepare myself with my colleagues and the government. It is not a bad budget, and it includes everything that could be undertaken under the present circumstances. Naturally, I was quite annoyed by what the opposition parties presented in their "solos," trying to slow things down. The modifications that I read through were mostly insignificant, and I still do not see a clear economic policy that would demonstrate that they invented something entirely new. Incidentally, it became rather apparent that it is not a healthy thing for parliament to vote at a plenary session whether the budget of certain

institutions should be increased or decreased by one, or three, million forints. This is an ill-conceived way, that is why I would support voting on individual issues instead, giving more authority to the committees. On occasion, I was also quite annoyed by the style of the debate, but what can we do? This is Hungary.

[Muzslai] What do you mean by that?

[Kupa] I mean that the Hungarian parliament has an excessively abrasive style although, it is true, it is second to that of the British Parliament. But, it is gentlemen who sit there.... I dislike any impolite and inhumane style, for one should not strive to humiliate the other person.

[Muzslai] The debate was long, requiring long hours of work. Nonetheless, you were able to read through all modifications during the debate; to what extent were you able to rely on your staff?

[Kupa] One's staff provides the only real support in such a heated situation. Of course, one remembers certain impressions regarding the speeches, one also takes notes, but it is the "team" that makes it possible to draw financial and economic consequences. I relied on my staff in many things. Fortunately, we understand one another without the need for many words.

[Muzslai] This year, you did not repeat your much-criticized promise of last year that you would not submit such a budget at such a time again. Regarding the future: Since at this time you served a rather high ball to the opposition with the delayed submission of the bill, will it be necessary to prepare the next budget perhaps a little earlier and through a different methodology, after learning any possible lessons? Will the state budget law possibly guarantee success next year? When will it be adopted?

[Kupa] I was annoyed hearing references now to the German budget and then to the American budget, and then again to the budget of so-called carved-up Hungary. These references were made to countries whose legislation is based on decades-long experiences and on principles of proprietorship that have been functioning for a long time, disregarding our transition period. This was a great misinterpretation. It is all right to build on constitutionality, but disregarding the rapid changes in external and internal conditions is a sign of provincialism. Another thing: The state budget law will be passed in the first quarter, and this provides us with a secure framework that must not be underestimated. For this it would be necessary to establish the spending structure of institutions, education, and a whole line of other areas. A budget based on a more secure foundation can be prepared after this law goes into effect. I do not know yet when it can be submitted. Incidentally, this year, too, everything was decided by the committees. I think it would be feasible for parliament to discuss the budget chapter by chapter at its plenary sessions, without the necessity of entertaining the public with trivial modifications. We should not deal with local issues that

are of secondary national importance. Of course, the conciliation of the coalition parties and the opposition must also begin much sooner, and everyone's expectations and needs must be brought to light. Also, there is a great chance that in the case of such a bill—which we do submit on time—the economic situation may change, or precisely because of delays in conciliation [as published]. This also depends on whether enough time is allowed for the discussion of such a bill.

[Muzslai] Do you have any influence on this in the government? The reason I ask is that it was the government that presented the representatives with quite a few bills of secondary importance in the last quarter.

[Kupa] No doubt there are many bills—e.g., the one on cooperatives—the discussion of which was postponed several times by the House Committee but which were nevertheless put on the agenda because certain people considered them politically important. This is an issue that belongs to the not-so-clear regulations of parliament's operation and the cooperation between the government and parliament.

[Muzslai] To what extent was it a question of prestige for you, i.e., for the government, to have the budget approved by the end of December? Is it true that the international financial world would have assessed Hungary in a more negative way if that had not happened? What would have happened if the budget would not have been approved?

[Kupa] I do not think that it was a question of prestige. At any rate, the government held that failure to have this bill passed would have been proof of its incompetence. I personally knew that "I am going to get it," as it indeed happened, but I also knew that if we could follow this through and could have this bill passed in a decent manner, that would also increase our prestige. I can also say, in this respect, that I am satisfied. Incidentally, we did not reckon with the possibility of parliament not passing the bill, but I can say now that we had prepared a transition bill. We were clearly aware—just as parliament was, including the opposition—that a budget was necessary for the country's functioning. This was also unequivocally important from the aspect of international considerations, the inflow of foreign capital, and our creditworthiness, and I refute any opposing opinion.

#### Party Condemns Process

92CH0296B Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP  
in Hungarian 2 Jan 92 p 4

[Statement issued on 31 December 1991 by the Alliance of Free Democrats, SZDSZ: "SZDSZ: The Vote Was a Parody"]

[Text] In the early morning hours on Tuesday, the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] forwarded the following statement to the MTI's [Hungarian Telegraph Agency's] editorial office in parliament:

"Despite the delayed submission of the budget bill and the machinations of the government and the government parties, the parliamentary faction of the Alliance of Free Democrats took our country's 1992 budget seriously. Even under time pressure, it did at the reallocation of funds everything possible to strengthen the positions of local governments, social groups in great predicament, education, and science with modification proposals.

"It presented valid arguments in both committee meetings and plenary sessions, although the discussion of details went on during the night of 29 December and the dawn of 30 December, both at the committee meetings and the plenary session, with no break for 21 hours under absolutely adverse conditions and in violation of the house rules. FIDESZ's [Federation of Young Democrats's] and SZDSZ's arguments were presented in the House without the government party representatives saying a single word; indeed, the benches of the government parties as well as the ministers' velvet chairs remained empty for long hours. The government majority used the hours set aside for detailed discussions to gather strength for the final act of power display. During this time, the Hungarian Democratic Forum banned TV and the photojournalists from the Parliament Building.

"On the morning of 30 December, the House Committee, consisting of officers of parliament and faction leaders, agreed on the order for the voting. Accordingly, the president adjourned the session between 1 AM to 8 AM on 31 December in order to allow the representatives responsible for deciding on about 1,000 modification proposals at least a minimum time for preparing and resting.

"Violating the agreement, House President Gyorgy Szabad called another meeting of the House Committee at midnight on 30 December, ordering the continuation of the meeting despite the protest of the opposition factions. The SZDSZ faction rejected the decision that made a mockery of the voting and, in accordance with the original agreement, was absent between 1 AM and 8 AM.

"The country's most important law was legislated at Kossuth Square by the government majority—as a state party—participating only by itself."

#### **Dornbach Charges Illegality**

92CH0296C Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
7 Jan 92 p 1

[Report by J. Tibor Keri on statements made by Alajos Dornbach, leader of Hungarian Democratic Forum and vice president of the parliament: "Dornbach: Parliament Has Been Humiliated"—first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Text] In talking about the discussion on this year's budget at the usual press conference last Friday, Gyorgy Szabad stated that parliament succeeded in passing the

bill without violating any of its constitutional obligations. Alajos Dornbach also expressed his opinion on the subject on Monday.

Parliament's vice president told our correspondent that it was evident to him already on 29 November—when the government submitted its budget bill—that the bill could not be passed in a legal manner, sensibly observing the house rules. For this reason, he asked the finance minister at the meetings of the House Committee to have a comprehensive bill prepared. "It is my steadfast opinion," said the vice president, "that no decision should have been made before 31 December regarding the issue of the budget, for that process was not legal. It was illegal to have committees meet during the plenary session. Moreover, the house rules are unequivocal in stating that if modifications are presented during a general debate session, then the session must be interrupted in order to study these modifications. It is clear, then, that this is what should have been done in the case of proposals presented during the detailed discussion. In accordance with the clear provision of the house rules, representatives who presented modification proposals must be invited in writing to the committee meetings. Not a single time was this done during the discussion of the budget. I dare state that most representatives did not even know what modification proposals they were voting on. On the last day alone, a hundred such proposals were distributed during the session, which we could not even read.

"These mistakes and absurdities must not be played down because that would mean playing down parliament's entire work. In which case, instead of legislation, it would suffice for the representatives to simply 'place a bet.' What happened was a humiliation for parliament."

#### **Tense Parliamentary Debate on Budget Described**

92CH0287A Budapest 168 ORA in Hungarian 7 Jan 92  
pp 4-5

[Interview with Andras Domany, radio reporter, by Zsafia Mihancsik; place and date not given: "A Hungarian Minimarathon Debate"—first paragraph is 168 ORA introduction]

[Text] Enactment of the 1992 state budget has sorely tried the Hungarian parliament's deputies. The debate and voting continued for three days, from dawn to dusk. Meanwhile the deputies came and went. During noisy or quiet days and nights, the chamber was often half-empty, and the tone of the debate was not always decorous. Regrettably, relations between the ruling and the opposition parties often became acrimonious. How did all this look to radio reporter Andras Domany? Zsafia Mihancsik interviewed him.

[Mihancsik] Let us begin with obstructionism, the first and most frequently made accusation. In other words, did the opposition obstruct parliament's business? Which of course meant a large number of motions to



amend, lengthy voting, and repeated contributions to the debate, just to let the budget debate run out of time. What is your opinion?

[Domany] The accusations are mutual, and I think everyone is right to some extent. The whole thing began with the government's delay in presenting the draft budget. The [finance] minister admitted as much and apologized for the delay. Admittedly, he added that he had been merely two weeks late. But that is indeed a fairly long delay. In democracies where everything is already running smoothly, moreover, the draft budget is presented not in early December or late November, but a good many months earlier. That leaves a quarter or half year for the budget debate. And it did not help much that the government had presented its budget-policy directive much earlier, because specific amendments may be proposed only to the draft budget itself, but not to the directive. And here the question arises as to what opportunities does the opposition have in a democracy? For under any parliamentary system the opposition is the opposition because it is in a minority. Thus it knows that it will be voted down. Therefore it is sitting in parliament not primarily in the hope of being able to persuade the government—although of course that too can and does occur on partial questions—but in order to voice its opinion. Say, to put its opinion on record for the sake of history, on the one hand. And on the other, in preparation for the next elections, to make it clear to the population, the citizens, in what way its own opinion differs from that of the government. In the hope that in the next elections people will have remembered just what the opposition said, and that perhaps it was right. So, if the opposition insists on expressing its views even though it knows that in most cases it will lose the vote, that in itself cannot be regarded as deliberate temporizing and a senseless waste of time.

#### Obstructionism?

But whether in some instances the opposition was more verbose in presenting its views than what would have been absolutely necessary is again a different question. In other words, from the opposition's behavior one could infer from time to time the attitude that since it was you—meaning the government—who were late, for us this whole thing is not really that urgent. But the contributions to the debate, generally speaking, were meaningful and to the point. Even on that certain Monday forenoon when the opposition spoke before practically empty ruling-party benches. You can check the record: Every contribution to the debate argued specific questions. In the sense of filibustering, therefore, the accusations of obstructionism will not stand up.

[Mihancsik] I read in the papers that a large proportion of the motions to amend came from deputies of the ruling parties. You were present during the entire budget debate and were able to judge for yourself to what extent were the ruling parties' motions to amend meaningful. Therefore, in principle, you can also tell whether the government's failure to harmonize the draft budget with

the coalition parties was a political blunder, forcing them to join the government's work by introducing motions to amend; or was it the ruling parties' intention to obstruct parliament's business with amendments, just to leave the opposition less time in which to introduce amendments of their own?

[Domany] I do not think that there was any intentional obstructionism. But the fact remains that the ruling parties' amendments also took up time, and it is likewise true that in a smoothly running democracy it would be quite strange if deputies of the ruling parties were to introduce hundreds of motions to amend. I discussed this with Minister Ivan Szabo, and he himself said that there should be better coordination, with the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] caucus and the caucuses of the other two ruling parties as well; lacking opportunity to articulate their own views before the debate, many deputies of the ruling parties are forced to present their views in the form of motions to amend. But there is also another side to this coin: I suspect that from time to time the government has deputies introduce motions to amend that it itself would be willing to accept. Or rather the parliament's rules of procedure compel the government to do so, because the mover of a motion cannot introduce a motion to amend his initial motion while it is still being debated. Thus a deputy of one of the ruling parties introduces as a motion to amend something that the Finance Ministry comes to regard as acceptable during the debate.

[Mihancsik] The fact or accusation of obstructionism ties in only indirectly with the two-week slippage. But there are two elements of the budget debate that are direct consequences of the government's tardiness. One is that the committee meetings and the plenary meeting had to proceed in parallel. Which meant that a proportion, or a large proportion, of the deputies—depending on how many of the committees were meeting—were unable to attend the plenary meeting and present arguments in support of their standpoints.

[Domany] Yes, because the smaller a caucus and the fewer economic experts in it, the more disturbing this situation becomes. After all, the same people would have to be present in several places at the same time. There actually were complaints about this, mainly from the opposition. At the same time it is also obvious that had the Budget Committee not been meeting continuously, even during the plenary meetings, it would have been impossible to finish the budget debate. It is quite another matter that there were scenes such as, for instance, when someone from the MDF took the floor, pointed dramatically to the opposition benches and said: "See, they are accusing us of not giving them an opportunity to debate, and now that they have an opportunity, they themselves are absent." Then someone from the opposition rushed in and said: "We cannot be here because we are attending a committee meeting." Undeniably, it also happened that some committee was unable to muster a quorum, because specifically members of the opposition failed to show up. Thus there were also mutual attempts

to annoy each other, but obviously the opposition found them the more annoying. The other parallel was that normally the various committees of the National Assembly first consider the motions to amend that fall within their respective scopes of authority, and then the Budget Committee sums up the committees' views. That was not possible on this occasion.

### Parody?

[Mihancsik] You said that in some instances the opposition failed to show up at either the plenary meeting or the committee meetings. I do not know where they were; but I do know that, in the debate on a draft budget introduced by the government, opposition deputies have a far more difficult time than do deputies belonging to the ruling parties. That is the conclusion I drew also from the debate which was continued sometime around 0100 on the last day of voting on the budget. The House Committee reconsidered the originally adopted resolution, according to which the National Assembly would have adjourned until 0800. Therefore [Speaker] Gyorgy Szabad decided on his own authority to continue the voting all night. Opposition deputies protested against his decision. To my mind, their objection was entirely logical. For they said that the ruling parties' deputies merely had to press the Aye or Nay button in accordance with the finance minister's nod. The subsequent voting procedure confirmed this as true. But the opposition deputies had to seek guidance from the experts of their respective parties, on more than a thousand motions to amend.

[Domany] In other words, the voting in their case is not automatic. But let us not pick on the ruling parties; voting is not necessarily automatic in their case, either.

[Mihancsik] Consequently, the opposition parties' deputies argued that what they needed most was meetings of their party caucuses, rather than sleep.

[Domany] Yes, but they also complained about lack of sleep, and their complaints were not unfounded. If I remember correctly, the speaker ordered two recesses—albeit brief ones—to enable the caucuses to hold consultations. Most probably, that really was not enough. The opposition obviously needs such consultations. After all, not everyone in an opposition party's caucus is an expert. Even so, the experts are preparing long syllabi for one another, on what to accept or reject. This undoubtedly was the cause of the conflict that erupted during the night from Monday to Tuesday and left parliament without an opposition for a while. The Socialists were the first to return, saying that although they protested against the procedure, they did not want to leave the opposition not represented by anyone; therefore they would participate in the voting. FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats] also returned somewhat later, saying that they wished to demonstrate by their presence the importance of the business before parliament, and that they had not gone to take a nap; but because they disagreed with the procedure, they would be merely

sitting there without taking part in the voting. But the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] insisted on resuming work only at 0800. The essence of the matter was that it must have been truly difficult to make decisions at one minute intervals on what to vote for and what to vote against. But let me tell you another interesting thing about that night: When the ruling coalition and a few independent deputies were left alone in the chamber, someone from the MDF introduced a motion that the chair refrain from stating each question as it was about to be voted on and merely identify it by number; the deputies would listen to the finance minister's opinion and then vote on each question. Deputy Speaker Alajos Dornbach (SZDSZ), who happened to be presiding at the time, replied: "I beg the honorable member's pardon, but that would be impossible. However, I will attempt to speed up the voting." It did indeed proceed faster. And, in my opinion, he was right in saying that the proposed motion would have been impossible, because then the SZDSZ would have been right in branding the whole procedure as a parody. There was loud applause when Alajos Dornbach rejected this motion, although (and this I wish to emphasize once again) there were no opposition-party deputies in the chamber; and Speaker Gyorgy Szabad, who was then sitting as a deputy, applauded ostentatiously. In other words, a majority of the ruling coalition did not want the whole thing to become farcical, either. But a conflict did exist nevertheless.

### Democracy?

[Mihancsik] There are times and there are situations in the life of a country and of a parliament when human energy really cannot be spared. In ignorance of the circumstances, I could perceive this period as such a time. In your opinion, however, is it permissible for a parliament to reach a point where not only human energy is being wasted, but even democracy is being violated on very important issues?

[Domany] In parliament, of course, views differ on whether democracy has truly been violated. Things like this do occur in budget debates even in the West. The prime minister did refer to the fact that sometimes even the American Congress or the German Bundestag debates the budget at the last minute and all night. In other words, the budget debate is an exceptional case. Time, I believe, will help to resolve this situation; the government and the new parliament that by now have been in office for nearly two years will eventually fall somehow into the groove. At the same time I also think that all this ties in to a large extent with the relationship between the government and the opposition. In my opinion, this sitting from Sunday through Tuesday has regrettably harmed the emotional and interpersonal relations between them. Namely, the government has interpreted the opposition's behavior clearly as an attempt to bring it down.



**Independent Management for Social Security**

92P20138A Budapest MAGYAR KOZLONY  
in Hungarian No 147, 28 Dec 91 pp 3,026-3,031

[Summary] Budapest MAGYAR KOZLONY in Hungarian No. 147, 28 Dec 91 pp 3,026-3,031 presents the full text of Law No. 84. of 1991 adopted by the National Assembly at its 12 December 1991 session concerning the autonomous governance of the social security system. The need for a social security system that provides "affected persons an opportunity to comment and to enforce their interests, as well as to discharge the state's responsibility" is established in the preamble.

In essence, the law establishes a quasi-parliamentary, autonomous decisionmaking system operating as a legal entity largely independent from the government, to formulate policy, render decisions, manage funds, and oversee what has been the state's social security bureaucracy. The pension and health insurance functions are separate, with each function overseen by separate elected governing bodies and general meetings, as well as by a common, 11-member executive committee in which insured persons are in the majority, and a common, nine-member internal supervisory committee in which representatives of employer interests are in the majority. The concept of elected "insurance representatives" serving voluntarily and without compensation in all of these bodies is significant. The law indirectly describes "insurance representatives" as insured lay persons as well as representatives of employer interests, but with respect to the composition of the general meeting of the pension insurance governing body the law limits the direct participation of actual pensioners to four out of 30 persons who represent pensioners' interests. This then might suggest that the remaining 26 persons representing pensioner interests would be professional insurance executives. No such limitation in direct representation applies to the health insurance organization.

Interface with the government takes place at the National Assembly, State Accounting Agency and at the governmental level in the form of establishing the autonomous organization's broad framework of operations, approvals, concurrences, audits, reporting requirements, control over the legality of action, and disciplinary action for wrongdoing, and through the operation of a governmental Supervisory Committee, as distinct from the organization's internal supervisory committee. The governmental Supervisory Committee would function only until the the first general meeting of the autonomous organization is convened.

The law provides for the reorganization and transfer of the existing social security organization and for the commencement of the activities of the new organization by 1 January 1993.

**Computer Electronics Firm President on Prospects**

92CH0318D Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP  
(Supplement) in Hungarian 10 Jan 92 p 1

[Interview with Microsystem President Peter Vadasz by Kalman Demeter; place and date not given: "Microsystem Started Out as a Success; Historical Nostalgia Is Not What Conjures Up the Idea of Trading With the Countries of the Former Monarchy"—first paragraph is MAGYAR HIRLAP introduction]

[Text] Today's 240-employee Microsystem was an eight-member small cooperative in 1983, but in recent years it has been mentioned among the largest Hungarian private enterprises. It acts as the distributor for Compaq and Data General in Hungary and doubled its sales last year. Peter Vadasz, the company's president, is one of 7,000 members of the Young Presidents' Organization and has established the Hungarian department of that organization. "I am slowly becoming too old for that," he says, "I am 46 years old. This international organization is very useful, the total output of the firms managed by these 7,000 people is greater than that of Germany, after all." In addition to this, he takes part in the work of the Business in the Community Foundation established by the prince of Wales, and serves as deputy chairman of GYOSZ [National Association of Manufacturers]. Despite all this he is concerned with the future.

[Vadasz] I can and cannot be proud of our accomplishments because measured on an international scale Microsystem is only a medium-sized firm, and we should also change the number of our workers.

[Demeter] Are there going to be layoffs at Microsystem?

[Vadasz] I would put it this way: We ought to change the composition. We do not really want to reduce the size of personnel. Although in the past the number of employees has continuously increased, we only reinforced certain activities to the detriment of others. This means that we will be forced to make personnel changes.

[Demeter] You just said that you had to develop certain branches to the detriment of others. What products are at issue.

[Vadasz] The Hungarian market for PC's which do not have a good brand name is visibly on the decline. On the other hand, telecommunications are clearly advancing and our firm has a forceful presence there: Every third fax machine sold in Hungary was manufactured by Microsystem. We hold a leading market position in regard to small telephone central station systems and we have exclusive sales rights for line multipliers. It seems that half of our sales will consist of telecommunications systems this year. In the beginning we started out with computer technology and we were very successful in selling personal computers. But it seems that the next few years will belong to digital telecommunications equipment and in this respect the emphasis continues to be on added value. I do not believe that electronic

equipment manufacturing has a future in a country of this size, but hundreds of firms will make a living from the assembly, software support and servicing of equipment manufactured in Japan, the United States or elsewhere, in other words, firms which add knowledge and reach international standards. Firms such as Microsystem, where more than 100 of the 240 employees hold university degrees and the same number if people also speaks foreign languages.

[Demeter] Now that as a result of import liberalization computer software is flowing into the country with a very low customs duty, we actually must compete with the most developed products. Will Hungarian entrepreneurs be able to face this competition?

[Vadasz] Indeed, we have some difficult years ahead. The once seemingly miraculous price margins have disappeared, we must work terribly hard for every penny earned. But I believe that Microsystem will be one of those firms which survives these difficult years, and although 1991 was very difficult from our standpoint, I do not expect anything better this year. I am saying this despite the fact that we doubled our sales in 1991.

[Demeter] In terms of money?

[Vadasz] The year before last our sales amounted to 1.6 billion [forints], not counting mutual sales between the firms of Microsystem. In 1991 our sales exceeded 3 billion forints. We achieved this result in a market where large enterprises virtually stopped buying machines.

[Demeter] Who are your customers?

[Vadasz] State organizations, the Honved Forces, the Post Office, the Border Guards, banks, new joint enterprises, and foreign mixed nationality enterprises, and our sales abroad have also been successful last year. But our sales to the Soviet Union have dropped to zero, even though previously we sold them goods worth hundreds of millions. Thus we must think over whether it pays to maintain our office in Moscow.

[Demeter] Do you have other foreign contacts?

[Vadasz] Jointly with another Hungarian firm we have a joint enterprise in the State of New Jersey in the United States. The primary function of this firm is to handle our imports. We wholly own our firm in Vienna, it handles primarily our Czech and Soviet business contacts.

[Demeter] Are you not exporting anything to the United States?

[Vadasz] We "export" software professionals. We have professionals at some very big name firms both in Switzerland and in the United States.

[Demeter] You mentioned Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union as your business partners. Are you making efforts in other markets?

[Vadasz] The Hungarian economy is changing and so are the economies of the neighboring countries. We must not forget that Australia or, for that matter, the United States are not the most obvious markets for Hungary, instead the neighboring countries and Germany are. At the same time, traditional partners like the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have completely dropped out of the picture at this time. I would not even call these "traditional" partners, but rather natural partners insofar as we are trading with our immediate neighbors. I regard peace in our vicinity as the condition for trade, because a country of the size of Hungary which is adversely situated in case of war, but is very well situated in times of peace can make a good living by providing services on a mass scale. I regard as a service provision the fact that Japanese factories have assembly plants in Hungary, because through us they gain access to the Common Market. Since we will become associate members of the Common Market, it will be worthwhile for Japanese and American firms to establish "bridgeheads" in Hungary. The more so because they do not dare to take a step further East from Hungary.

[Demeter] And is Microsystem not going to open toward the East?

[Vadasz] Look, for a while there will be troubles with the eastern market simply because they have no solvent demand. True, last year we sold equipment to Czechoslovakia worth 320 million forints, but I am still skeptical about Romania. Not to mention the Soviet Union.

[Demeter] The South-Slavic republic could also present a serious market after the war that is now raging at our southern borders....

[Vadasz] This is why I mentioned natural markets. Historical nostalgia is not what conjures up the idea of trading with the countries of the former monarchy. An established agricultural and industrial structure does not change in 40 years, even though there has been socialism here for that many years. Indeed, our most natural trading partners are the neighboring countries, including Croatia and Slovenia as well as Serbia, of course. I just hope that the war comes to an end as soon as possible.

[Demeter] I understand that Microsystem is about to raise its capital stock. By how much?

[Vadasz] Microsystem is selling \$8.5 million worth of stock exclusively abroad. These shares have a nominal value of 10,000 forints, and we sell it for 39,000. This is a private sale because we feel that in these days we should not enter the stock market.... Our buyers include the very prestigious European Bank for Reconstruction and Development established by 21 European countries, and Microsystem is the first stock investment to be accomplished by this bank. They are buying \$3 million worth of stock, but in the same way, the Hungarian-American Investments Fund also acts as a serious investor to the tune of \$2.5 million. The remaining one or two million dollars worth of stock will be divided among several investors.

[Demeter] Would Microsystem fail if this action were to fail?

[Vadasz] Of course not. We need this money in order to avoid the necessity to borrow funds. Our firm operates with a not too high level of operating capital, we have a bank loan in the approximate amount of between 300 million and 320 million forints. But in today's world this represents an interest payment of between 120 million and 130 million forints, and all of that could be profits. This will be Microsystem's real gain as a result of this stock issue, and we would spend the rest of the money for development.

[Demeter] Many causes seek funding from corporations of the size of Microsystems. You, too, are being contacted, I would guess.

[Vadasz] We receive such letters virtually every day. We support, for example the Hungarian branch of the largest American charitable organization called United Way International. I am a member of its board of directors and the organization endeavors to combine funds received from many small foundations and to support certain purposes in a concentrated fashion.

In addition, jointly with two local governments and a bank we established the King Matthew Foundation to establish a six grade talent development gymnasium in a Soviet barracks which could be frequented not only by Hungarian speaking children from Hungary beginning at age 12. We are also planning to establish a foundation to support public safety, because a request like this must not be rejected.

**Government's Ministerial Staffing Detailed**

92EP0198A Warsaw PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY  
in Polish No 4, 26 Jan 92 pp 1, 8

[Article by Miroslaw Cielemecki, Iwona Jakalska, Ewa Kacprzycka, Jolanta Makowska, Tomasz Markiewicz, Grazyna Musialek, Barbara Oledzka, Piotr Pytlakowski, and Mariusz Urbanek: "A New Broom: A New Wave of Political Appointment is Underway"]

[Text] First there was the painful birth of the new ruling coalition. Next, the prime minister had problems with ministerial appointments. He even mistook a financial expert, Lutkowski, for a certain Rutkowski, but that is a bagatelle. Much more disturbing was the fact that appointee Lutkowski had at first resisted, then accepted the appointment, but admitted that he was not yet conversant with the budget issues but would study them. At last, all the ministerial appointments were completed and it was to be expected that the new government would start to govern. This may even have happened, but first of all the government began to conduct a resolute purge of senior officials, as well as to criticize the previous government.

Prime Minister Jan Olszewski declared recently that, had he known of the state's condition, he would not have accepted the responsibility. His sincerity is laudable, but this raises the question of why he was unaware of what the average recipient of the mass media is aware.

Minister of Labor Jerzy Kropiwnicki declared to reporters that economists (who now occupy the major posts in the government) can be divided into two classes: those with the mentality of a chief accountant and those who are entrepreneurially-minded. If we understood that minister well, chief accountants used to be in the previous government, whereas entrepreneurs, who view the economy from the profitmaking standpoint, predominate in Jan Olszewski's cabinet. But this is where problems arise. To be sure Adam Glapinski, the ex-minister of construction in the Bielecki administration, was an accountant by profession, but does that mean that, on being appointed minister of foreign economic cooperation by the present administration, he has become an entrepreneur? And what about Jerzy Eysymontt and Ewaryst Waligorski?

Appointments to senior posts at the ministries are still continuing. At some ministries a veritable personnel revolution is underway, while in others the pace of the changeovers is more relaxed. Observers gain the impression that the guiding principle is partisanship rather than professional qualifications. The accusation that a new *nomenklatura* is in the making has been made. Some argue that all the intense effort spent on the new appointments will be wasted, because the present administration will not endure long. Under this theory, a new broom will sweep clean and a new *nomenklatura* will, in its turn, be created.

For the present, personnel changeovers are continuing. In principle, everything is taking place behind closed doors. Only unofficial or semiofficial information is received from the offices. The press speculates on availing itself of so-called well-informed sources.

**At the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy:**

At that ministry personnel shifts have gained the most publicity.

Deputy ministers Joanna Starega-Piasek and Andrzej Urbanik (both of the UD [Democratic Union] were dismissed. Minister Jerzy Kropiwnicki (ZChN [Christian-National Union]) offered the portfolio of a deputy minister to his associate from Lodz, Andrzej Slowik. The following deputy ministers were left in their positions: Aleksandra Wiktorow, unaligned; Irena Wojcicka, unaligned; and Andrzej Baczkowski, unaligned. Also retained was Bartlomiej Piotrowski, except that the scope of his competences was altered, since the handling of employment and unemployment was transferred to Andrzej Slowik.

**At the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation:**

At that ministry there was merely a minor earthquake. The economic ideologue Adam Glapinski (PC [Center Accord]) accepted the resignation of Zbigniew Okonski (a Solidarity activist) and Andrzej Budzinski (recently unaligned, previously PZPR [Polish United Worker's Party]). The new deputy ministers are: Janusz Fajkowski, unaligned, previously Polish commercial attache in Montreal and Wacław Niewiarowski, previously Gorzow Voivode, linked to Peasant Accord. In addition, Adam Glapinski replaced the heads of several departments, the ministry's press spokesman, and his chief of staff (now Michal Frackowiak).

**At the Strategic Ministries of National Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Internal Affairs:**

At these ministries personnel shifts have for the time being remained limited, although it is being said that just a small breach in the dike would suffice to trigger a big flood.

The fewest changes occurred at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its head has remained the same, and so have its secretaries and undersecretaries of state.

At the Ministry of National Defense restructuring has long been underway in connection with its division into a civilian ministry and a military general staff. The newly appointed minister, Jan Parys moved to his office on Klonowa Street directly from the CUP [Central Planning Office], where he had been, as a civilian, working on defense matters. The first personnel decision of the new minister was to transfer to reserve status (with a pension) ex-Minister of National Defense, Piotr Kolodziejczyk. To this day, this matter remains unclear. The president declared that Rear Admiral Kolodziejczyk should work for the good of the country, but the ruling

coalition does not view this as necessary. Bronislaw Komorowski and Janusz Onyszkiewicz, both UD members, continue in their posts as deputy ministers. The duties of chief of staff are exercised by Gen. Div. Zdzislaw Stelmaszczuk.

It had been expected that the new Minister of Internal Affairs Antoni Macierewicz would start a personnel upheaval within his ministry, but so far calm is reigning there. The new minister is a ZChN member. Some people are drawing attention to a certain similarity in appearance between Macierewicz and the notorious Feliks Dzerzhinsky, but that is assuredly mere malice.

The new minister of internal affairs has accepted the resignation of Roman Hula, commander in chief of Citizens' Militia, but it had already been submitted while Majewski was still the minister, and according to the official news release, it was motivated by personal reasons. It was said that both previous deputy ministers, Jerzy Zimowski and Jan Widacki, and the chief of the UOP [Office of State Protection], Andrzej Milczanowski, would also be dismissed, but so far these expectations have not proved true. On the other hand, the post of a third deputy minister was created, and it went to Piotr Naimski, a fellow ZChN member and GLOS [a periodical] editorial associate of Macierewski. Basically, the precise duties to be assigned to Editor Naimski at the Ministry of Internal Affairs are still unknown, because the practice so far has been for the work of the UOP to be supervised directly by the minister rather than by some deputy minister.

An unwritten rule of nonpartisanship is being followed at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The new minister and deputy minister have not, however, declared an intent to leave their party identity cards in the concierge's office [i.e., have not avowed their nonpartisanship].

The composition of the existing Political Advisory Committee under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a body conceived as far back as during the "round-table" era, remains interesting and pluralist. Well, the members of that committee remain Tadeusz Bien (formerly of the SD [Democratic Party], now of the KL-D [Liberal-Democratic Congress]), Andrzej Gdula (formerly of the PZPR now of the SdRP [Social Democrats of the Republic of Poland]), Krzysztof Kozlowski (ex-minister, UD), Michal Kurek (PSL [Polish Peasant Party]), Jerzy Merlewski (PAX [a Catholic leftist grouping]), and Janusz Palubnicki (Solidarity). Recently a new member, Przemyslaw Hniedziewicz (formerly of PAX, now of the PC) has been co-opted.

#### At the Ministry of Finance:

For the present it seems becalmed. In the country's present situation, this is doubtless the most important ministry of state and no "castling" of senior officials in that temple of Fiscus would fail to leave ripples of publicity. Ex-Minister of Finance Leszek Balcerowicz has been nominated Man of the Year for 1991 by several major newspapers. It was even suggested that he deserves

a Nobel prize. On the other hand, he had been under continual fire from the opposition, and the new ruling coalition did not deem possible cooperation with "Iron Leszek."

So far only the director and deputy director of the Legal Department, Andrzej Jasinski and Dorota Szubielska (both considered top experts) have left the Ministry of Finance. Minister Karol Lutkowski (unaligned, previously an adviser to Balcerowicz), has not officially forecast any changes at the top. But it is being said, and quite loudly at that, that Secretary of State Andrzej Podsiadlo and undersecretaries Stefan Kawalec and Danuta Demianiuk will be resigning. There is also speculation about Deputy Minister Wojciech Misiag ("Would you entrust him with your money?") and Undersecretary of State Ryszard Paura. But so far there has been no news about their replacements.

#### At the Ministry of Agriculture:

The only change there, in addition to the appointment of Gabriel Janowski (Solidarity) as the new minister, has been the resignation submitted by Secretary of State Slawomir Gburczyk, unaligned. Henryk Antosiak (PSL) and Mieczyslaw Stelmach have been retained in their jobs as undersecretaries of state.

But it is to be expected that Gabriel Janowski, previously a Solidarity activist, will initiate major personnel shifts in order to gain credibility in the eyes of voters. Observers also remain curious as to whether a new agricultural policy will be implemented. On the one hand, promises given to the farmers will count, but on the other so will the realities of the situation.

#### At the Ministry of National Education:

An atmosphere of waiting for the first decisions of Andrzej Stelmachowski (unaligned, previously Speaker of the Senate) is reigning at that ministry. This ministry may serve as an example of a fatally poor relationship between reporters and responsible (irresponsible?) officialdom. That is because the ministry's female press spokesperson, whose term of appointment was just then about to expire, told a PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY reporter that she was unaware of any personnel changes, although just a week previously Anna Radziwill and Andrzej Janowski had submitted their resignations to Minister Stelmachowski. In particular, the eventual departure of Deputy Minister Radziwill has outraged the educational community, which is expected to protest it publicly.

Undersecretaries of State at the Ministry of National Education Tadeusz Diem and Roman Duda remain in their positions. During a session of the Sejm's Education Committee Andrzej Stelmachowski commented, "There is no compulsion or psychological need to make partisan personnel appointments." Yet the rumor is that should the resignations of the two abovementioned deputy ministers be accepted, they will be replaced with partisan



appointees. Anna Radziwill is supposedly to be replaced by a PSL member, and Andrzej Janowski by a ZChN representative.

**At the Ministries of Culture, Justice, Environmental Protection, and Health:**

Over there, a calm before the storm reigns. Nothing is supposedly happening, no pieces are being moved on the chessboard, but the employees of these ministries are aware that in the end there will be some personnel shifts.

The Ministry of Culture is headed by Andrzej Sicinski, unaligned. Its press spokesman has announced that, until a restructuring plan is worked out, which should take about six weeks, no appointments or dismissals are to be expected. Thus, the following person remain deputy ministers: Michal Jagiello, appointed by ex-Minister Cywinska, nowadays unaligned; Agnieszka Morawska, unaligned; Grzegorz Michalski, unaligned; and Waldemar Dabrowski, unaligned.

At the Ministry of Justice Wieslaw Chrzanowski (ZChN) will be replaced by a fellow ZChN member, Zbigniew Dyka. The new minister has declared, "For the time being no personnel shifts are expected." The ministry's employees also believe that there is no need for such shifts, considering that the previous minister has already made them. Thus, the following persons remain deputy ministers: Andrzej Marcinkowski, un-aligned; and Jadwiga Skorzevska-Losiek, unaligned. The following retain the rank of undersecretaries of state: Stanislaw Iwanicki, first deputy prosecutor general, unaligned; and Stefan Sniezko, unaligned but a candidate for the Senate from the KLD list in the recent elections.

The new Minister of Environmental Protection Stefan Kozlowski (brother of the former Minister of Internal Affairs Krzysztof Kozlowski of the UD) is unaligned. Similarly deputy ministers Roman Andrzejewski and Bernard Blaszczyk are unaligned. Third Deputy Minister Michal Wilczynski is a PC member.

At the Ministry of Health everything remains as of old. The new Minister Marian Miskiewicz, unaligned, has retained the deputy ministers Piotr Mierzewski and Zbigniew Halat, both unaligned, as well as Krystyna Sienkiewicz (UD). But there are rumors circulating in the ministry's hallways to the effect that at least one of these deputy ministers will have to go.

**At the Ministries of Ownership Transformation, Communications, Industry, and Construction:**

At these ministries the situation so far has been strange and unprecedented, since they are headed by directors rather than by ministers of state. Well, from the legal standpoint, the director of a ministry is not a member of the government, because he has not been appointed to that position by the Sejm. By the same token, he does not have to, for example, account for his sins before the State Tribunal. The responsibility for the director rests squarely on the prime minister.

The Director of the Ministry of Ownership Transformation is Tomasz Gruszecki, a previous adviser to Balcerowicz, unaligned. The following have left the ministry owing to, it is being said, their low salaries: Undersecretaries Wojciech Goralczyk and Grzegorz Jedrzejczak, as well as, for other reasons, Jacek Siwicki, a close associate of Jan K. Bielecki. Undersecretary of state Tomasz Stankiewicz has been promoted to the post of first deputy minister. Tomasz Strzelecki, previously a department director, has also been promoted to the post of a deputy minister.

At the Ministry of Communications the new director is Marek Rusin, formerly a deputy minister. Over there the situation is stable: No one has departed from his post and there have been no new appointments. The two deputy ministers, Stanislaw Szuder and Andrzej M. Wilk, have declared themselves to be politically unaligned.

The Ministry of Industry is headed by Andrzej Lipko. The last personnel decision of Mrs. Bochniarz was to dismiss Director General Krzysztof Ulewski. And as soon as Andrzej Lipko took over as the head of that ministry, deputy ministers Marek Kulczycki and Jacek Krawczyk, both considered as "Mrs. Bochniarz's men," submitted their resignations. Deputy Minister Malgorzata Niepokulczycka has retained her post. For the time being Andrzej Lipko appointed only one new senior official, Stanislaw Padykula, although to be sure not exactly new since he had already been a member of the ministry's collegium during the tenure of Minister Zawislak.

At the Ministry of Construction, where the new director is the ex-Deputy Minister Andrzej Diakonow (PC) no personnel shifts have taken place. Two PC members, Jerzy Zadrzalka and Krzysztof Zmijewski, and the unaligned Adam Kowalewski, remain undersecretaries of state.

As can be seen from the above, some political appointments have been made, but this is not the rule yet. Everything depends on the decisions of the new heads of ministries. Prime Minister Olszewski seems reluctant to intervene in the personnel decisions of the members of his cabinet. Some of his subordinates are exploiting this situation to the hilt, while others are acting in a more reasoned manner.

One thing still remains unknown: Will the cabinet of early 1992 still be the cabinet of late 1992?

**Future of Christian Democratic Parties Discussed**

*92EP0175B Warsaw LAD No 2, 12 Jan 92 pp 1, 3-5*

[Article by Maciej Letowski: "Do Christian Democratic Parties Still Have a Future?"]

[Text] In July 1988 the Public Opinion Research Center asked Poles whether, in their opinion, the formation of a Christian party is needed. Forty-four percent of the



respondents replied more or less decidedly "yes," and only 26 percent said "no." In a poll conducted by the Center for Research on Public Opinion after the last parliamentary elections, in answer to a question asked regarding support for particular groupings (those polled could check more than one party) 37 percent of the respondents declared their support for Christian Democracy (CD), 35 percent for Center Accord (PC), and 30 percent for the Party of Christian Democrats (PChD). These data confirm the widespread intuitive conviction that for years in Poland there has been unceasingly large social support, as high as 40 percent, for Christian democracy.

And now let us compare this fact with the results obtained in the last elections by three Christian democratic groupings: 8 percent of the voters voted for PC, 2 percent for CD, and 1 percent for PChD. Altogether, 11 percent of the persons voting in the elections gave their votes to the three Christian democratic parties. Can there be a more embarrassing situation when the Polish Friends of Beer Party has almost twice as many deputies as CD and PChD together? How did it happen that only one person out of the four who are willing to accept a Christian democratic party voted for one of the three Christian democratic parties? Why is there no strong and socially credible Christian democratic party in Poland and is there still a chance that there will be one? And if there is, what should be done so as not to squander this chance once again?

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Let us first take a look at how the leaders of the Christian democratic parties assess the results obtained by these parties. Quite enigmatically. For Maciej Wrzeszcz the result is "unsatisfactory." For Krzysztof Pawlowski the "result is clearly below expectations." Ryszard Bender calls it a "defeat" and Włodzimierz Bojarski calls it a "decided defeat." An assessment of the election results is extremely important, because it is a rule that the more boldly one looks the truth in the eyes, the greater the chances for the future, and the more drastic and effective the remedial measures. Thus I prefer to follow Professor Bojarski's example and speak of a decided defeat because I believe that a jolt is needed which will prevent the total elimination of Christian democratic parties from public life. And this is a prospect which is completely real.

I have taken an active part in Christian democratic initiatives for a long time in Poland. Therefore, it seems to me that I know the Polish Christian democratic parties from the "inside." And it is this experience and these observations, dictated by great sympathy and good wishes for Christian democratic ideas, that tell me to say with complete candor: Responsibility for failure to take advantage of this potential opportunity, for the elections defeat of the Christian democratic parties, lies with the leading figures of the Christian democratic movement.

What led to this defeat?

The first to receive the Christian democratic "golden horn" [symbol derived from Polish literature denoting the leadership of the state] was the Labor Party (SP).

It is one of the oldest political parties. Despite the objections of the communist authorities, it renewed its activities already in February 1989, before anyone even dreamed of the Democratic Union (UD), the Liberal-Democratic Congress (KLD), WAK [Catholic Election Campaign], or CD. It held some impressive trump cards: a history going back to the Second Republic, emigrant activists—well-entrenched in the international Christian democratic movement, formal membership in the Christian Democratic International, the friendship of the church, a candidate for leader in the person of the erstwhile widely respected attorney, Sila-Nowicki, and certain financial resources. It is not surprising, therefore, that during the largest part of 1989, it is to the SP that emissaries of the political initiatives came, seeking in this party a chance to create an important Christian democratic grouping. Unfortunately, the SP leaders did not know how to take advantage of this situation. As a consequence, organizations independent of SP began to be formed. The most dramatic signal that SP may lose its position among the Christian groupings was the formation, in the fall of 1989, of the Christian National Union (ZChN). Politically, SP spoiled its chance during the presidential campaign. As the only Christian democratic grouping, it refused to support the candidacy of Lech Walesa, and its president—guided by unrealistic ambitions—decided to run for president himself. From that moment on, SP not only stopped expanding, it started to go down, and gradually such important politicians as W. Piotrowski, R. Bender, J. Maziariski, and J. Zablocki, left its ranks.

Because nature abhors a vacuum, the field vacated by SP was filled by someone else. In the fall of 1990, all of the newly arising Christian democratic parties, such as the Christian Labor Party (ChPP) (Jozef Hermanowicz), the Christian Democracy (CD) (Kazimierz Barczyk), and the parties which were formed from the breakup of SP—the Christian Democratic Party (PChD) (Michał Drozdek), and Christian Democratic Party "Unification" (ChDS—"Z") (Janusz Zablocki), supported the candidacy of Lech Walesa.

#### Center Accord (PC)

PC became the platform around which those who supported Lech Walesa rallied.

In the fall of 1990, PC membership, in addition to the Christian democrats, included liberals and peasant party members. In order not to become lost in such a politically diverse environment, the Christian democrat activists, created within the PC a Christian Democratic Forum. By so doing, the Christian democratic "golden horn" passed to the hands of PC, which obtained, as another grouping, a chance at creating a strong Christian democratic party. In order to achieve this goal it was

necessary to integrate the Christian democratic groupings which were in PC's sphere of influence in the fall of 1990. To do this, PC had to be transformed into an ideologically similar Christian democratic party. But the leader of PC, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, did not take this step. At the PC's congress in February 1991 he rejected the proposal of the Krakow Christian Democracy to give the new party a distinctly Christian democratic face. This distinction was not entered into the name of the new party, and its members included not only Christian democrats, but also liberals and peasant party members, and above all, members of citizens committees who had not declared themselves ideologically—all with equal rights. J. Kaczynski belittled the participation in the creation of the new party of those Christian-democratic groupings which were already in PC or were heading towards it. The effect was—as the press at that time wrote—that a “Christian democratic party” was formed without Christian democrats. This was an exaggeration, because there were Christian democrats in it, but it is not they who took the lead in this initiative. They were, and are, a minority in PC, not always listened to, and dominated by people for whom immediate political results are more important than Christian democratic values.

The price for such behavior by PC leaders was the loss of those Christian democratic groupings which already were in PC. The price was also the inability to obtain new Christian democratic circles and initiatives which arose after PC was formed (this was the same sin that SP had committed earlier). A kind of reluctance towards PC on the part of Catholic and church circles appeared, and also on the part of the Christian Democratic International which granted PC only observer status. PC itself, unsure of its identity, ultimately accepted the membership (just as KLD did) of the rightwing and conservative European Democratic Union. Not only were many Christian democrats disillusioned with the position of the PC leaders, but also most of the liberals—who formed their own party (KLD), and the peasants from the Polish Peasant Party “Solidarity” (PSL-“S”)—who entered into an alliance with “S” RI [Rural Solidarity] and PSL [Polish Peasant Party] (Mikolajczyk's group).

Already in the middle of 1991 it was clear that PC, although it will undoubtedly play an important role in public life, will not create a credible Christian democratic party. The elections confirmed this. Of the deputies now sitting in the present Sejm as PC members, no more than 20-30 percent, as calculated by the activists in the Christian democrat set in this party, are Christian democrats. A great deal points to the fact that the expansion rate of PC is already beginning to slow down. The attraction to PC was the belief that this will be the strongest party, which will open the road to advancement, particularly in the outlying areas, to ambitious activists (under the slogan of decommunization) and the image that PC is a party close to Lech Walesa, a pro-presidential party. Today both these concepts lie in ruins. PC, despite its wealthy resources, lags behind not

only the postcommunist SdRP [Social Democracy of the Polish Republic], not only behind its main opponent from the “Solidarity” camp—the Democratic Union, but also behind the Christian National Union, so belittled by PC leaders. The scandalous parting of J. Kaczynski with President Walesa cost PC another bargaining chip. A party which is ideologically cohesive, tight-knit, can withstand a defeat. Had PC really become a Christian democratic party a year ago, it could have more easily today coped with its difficulties, but that did not happen.

When the leadership of PC rejected part of the Christian democratic groups, the Party of Christian Democrats, established in December 1990 at the initiative of dynamic deputies and senators belonging to the Christian Democrats Circle in the Parliamentary Citizens Club (OKP), saw a chance for itself. This party put forth the idea of a Polish Christian Democracy Congress.

By so doing, in the spring of 1991 the Christian democratic “golden horn” fell into its hands. The advantage of this initiative was precisely what was PC's main defect—agreement to an evolutionary and bottom-up building of a Christian democratic party and respect for the identity of the particular participants of the Congress.

The First Congress of the Polish Christian Democracy in May 1991 was attended by representatives of the following: PChD, OKP Christian Democrats Circle, ChPP, ChDS-“Z,” Christian Democracy Party, the Polish Catholic Social Union (PZKS), and the “August '80 Political Club.” ChDSP [Christian Democratic Labor Party], constantly vacillating as to whether it should take part in this initiative and deluding itself as to its own mission and strength, did not attend the Congress. The Polish Christian Democratic Forum was not invited to attend because the PChD political activists did not want to request the cooperation of a political group which arose from “PAX.” Had the Congress expanded its activity, there was a real chance that ChDSP would have been drawn into it and PChD would have been cautiously coopted. Had this happened, a strong Polish Christian democratic integration center would have been formed, one that was ideologically better defined than PC, with both political trump cards and significant financial means. Unfortunately, it soon turned out that the initiators of the Congress, the leaders of PChD, lost heart in their work. It appears that the preelection calculations prevailed. This was confirmed by the next steps that this grouping took, e.g., before it decided to finally put forth its candidates, it conducted talks on its own for the purpose of entering into a coalition, if not with PC, than with the Republican Coalition.

Had all of the participants of the Congress, plus those groupings which were disposed to it, participated in a joint elections coalition, the Christian democratic club in the parliament would today number at least several members, and possibly—taking the effects of joint action into account—even a few votes more. Even though this would not have been a satisfactory result, at least a bitter defeat would have been avoided.

Another chance was also wasted. This was the Wilanow agreement. In talks at Fr. Boguslaw Bijak's in the summer of 1991, representatives of Christian democratic and ZChN groupings took part. Thus the Catholic Electoral Campaign could have become a joint elections committee of these two Christian forces. With a large degree of probability it can be said that the result obtained by the Campaign would have been better, and possibly the Campaign would have eclipsed the Democratic Union. As part of the coalition with ZChN, the Christian democratic groupings would probably have obtained more than the nine votes which the PChD and ChD now have, together, in the Sejm. Unfortunately, first the PChD withdrew from the Wilanow talks, and then the leaders of ChDSP, by taking the position they did, ruined their chance for an agreement with ZChN. The latter, seeing the collapse of cooperation within the Christian democratic parties, towards the end of the talks in Wilanow offered its potential allies less and less. The result was that ZChN grabbed the whole loaf and the Christian democrats go the crumbs.

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So much for the past. It is time to ask what next, is there still a chance that the losses suffered can be made up. Usually the Christian democratic politicians reply affirmatively to this question. Maciej Wrzeszcz maintains that five deputies in the Sejm enables a presence on the political scene and further efforts should be made to create a strong Christian democratic grouping. He recommends cooperation with ZChN in parliament from a "partnership position." But Senator Pawlowski from PChD believes that "Christian democracy still has a chance for success" and asks whether the Polish Christian Democratic Congress should be reactivated. Ryszard Bender, on the other hand, does not believe that it will be possible to independently create a strong Christian democratic grouping and suggests that the Christian democratic forces unite with the Christian national ones, which he demonstrated by joining ZChN.

I believe that the Polish Christian democrats have three choices:

- Build a Christian democratic grouping outside of PC and ZChN, possibly using the Congress as a base.
- Join PC.
- Join ZChN in order to strengthen the Christian democratic orientation in one party or the other.

Let us look at the chances and the advantages of these proposals.

Building a Christian democratic grouping outside of PC and ZChN has the advantage that from the very beginning only Christian democratic forces would participate in this. Thus, disputes and rivalry about influences from other ideological orientations (national in one case, leftist and liberal in the other), are avoided. But the disadvantage of this solution is that the political work begins in a psychological atmosphere of the elections defeat which all the Christian democratic groupings

suffered. Also, taking into account that they have a small and weak representation in parliament, in the building of a Christian democracy they could not take advantage of the trump cards gained from active participation in politics. And competition (PC and ZChN) during the next term will always be foremost, and will be ever present in social awareness.

But if this path is chosen it must be entered on as quickly as possible. All forces must be utilized and the action must be extremely consistent, using the lessons learned from the elections defeat.

Point one—unity. If the Congress was to be the place at which integration was to take place, then all Christian democratic parties, without exception and without any ostracism, should have a right to be present. All they would have to do is guarantee loyal cooperation and consent to real and rapid measures aimed at integration. Possibly the best solution would be not to reactivate Congress with all of its psychological and political baggage, but to create a completely new party, to which, on the principle of individual access, all those would apply who would be worth obtaining in behalf of the rebirth of Christian democracy.

Second, Christian democratic leaders, who are responsible for the elections defeat, must suffer the consequences of their mistakes. Some should remove themselves from the forefront, others should make a convincing case that they will not repeat their mistakes. It would also be very good if the Christian democratic elite were to be younger. The creation of a strong party when it is necessary to start from such a difficult point, can only be the work of people with enormous energy and the will to work. Persons without political qualifications but with overblown ambitions should also be removed from influence on the building of a new Christian democracy. Politics is a profession like any other. It requires knowledge and skill, and ambition with nothing to back it up leads only to defeat, both individual and collective. Because the Polish Christian democratic movement does not have a leader on the scale of Adenauer, Schuman or deGasperi—and too bad that it does not—the task of creating a new Christian democracy should fall to a convention of persons who are universally respected and known from the consistency and effectiveness of their actions.

And finally, the deputies and senators already in parliament should have a vital role in publicly promoting a new Christian democracy. The three musketeers in ZChN—Niesiolowski, Lopuszanski, and Jurek—have already shown what a few deputies can do for their party. Unfortunately, the nine Christian democratic deputies in ChD and PChD have limited themselves, thus far, to standing by silently during political debates important to Poland. If serious consideration is to be given to a new Christian democracy, they would have to get down to some real work.

If the Christian democratic groupings (from PChD to ChDSP and PFChD) do not enter on this path quickly, dynamically and spectacularly, then in the next term they will not have even one deputy. One thing is certain—the amendment to the elections law will at least bring in some changes that the winners in the last elections will use to strengthen their chances and knock off potential competitors. In the next parliament there will no longer be any four or five person “clubs.”

Let us now look at the other paths leading to the building of a strong Christian democracy in Poland. What links them is the lessons to be drawn from the elections and the fact that the Christian democratic grouping appearing under its own banners lost, and two parties (PC and ZChN) won. In both these parties there are Christian democratic tendencies, greater or lesser. In politics it is no disgrace to latch onto a stronger party and support, within it, a Christian democratic wing, with the expectation that it may be possible to transform either PC or ZChN into a clearly Christian democratic party. In choosing this path, it must first be determined which party is more receptive to a political and ideological transformation of this type and where the greatest chances for success lie.

PC is favored because this party has already described itself as Christian democratic. It would suffice, therefore, to hold it to its word and convince its present leaders that they cannot continue to build a Christian democratic party without Christian democrats. Today the chances for this may be much larger than they were a year ago, since the leaders of PC are no longer very convinced about their strength and perhaps their slighting relationship to other Christian democratic groupings has changed. That could have been thought were it not for the recent sad events in PC, as a result of which the Christian democratic formation found itself in opposition to the leaders of PC. It is even possible that there will be a split in PC and the remaining Christian democratic activists will leave this party, or there will be a purge and the PC leaders will throw out the Christian democrats. These circumstances make it very doubtful that a Christian democracy can be built in the future based on PC. Unless something changes.

If not PC, then perhaps ZChN is the party which is worth recommending to the Christian democrats. Although ZChN is a Christian party, which makes it similar to the Christian democratic, it is also a grouping with nationalistic ideas, which does not have much in common with the Christian democratic doctrine. But let us also admit that the ideological identity of ZChN has not yet been finally determined. Many local activists joined ZChN only for metapolitical reasons: Since I am a Pole, since I am a Catholic, I am a member of ZChN. It is good that such an identification was made, but it cannot suffice, because a concrete political program does not grow out of it. In most European countries the program of the Christian democratic party is the one that is closest to the Catholics who are faithful to the church and its social teachings. And it is in this direction that the formation

work with ZChN could begin. The activists in the already existing Christian democratic parties could be helpful in this work. If the ZChN leaders do not choose this direction for their party, then ZChN will inevitably evolve in the direction of a rather anachronistic traditionalist national grouping, one with no counterpart in Europe and distant from the post ecumenical council social thought of the church. Therefore, this would have negative consequences not only for ZChN itself, but also for social Catholicism in Poland and for the Church.

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I expect that in Christian democrat circles, a serious discussion about the future will soon begin. I expect that a common goal, a common path, will be defined. I expect consistency in the implementation of this goal. It is possible, unfortunately, that there will be no discussion, no decisions will be made, and that there will be silence and time-delaying calculations. If this happens, there will be no Christian democracy in Poland, because after the next elections the party structure will already be definitively shaped. And, as the experience of other democracies teaches, once the party structure is created, it lasts for decades by the force of inertia. Thus there is little time. A year or two at the most. Later all that will remain is wailing and the gnashing of teeth.

What is needed, therefore, and I repeat, is discussion. A meeting of all those who want to devote their time to a Christian democracy is needed. A quick decision is needed. The columns of LAD are open for this discussion. We shall see whether anyone wants to take advantage of them.

#### Union Leaders on Centralization, Politicization

92EP0199A Warsaw PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY  
in Polish No 4, 26 Jan 92 p 3

[Interviews with various trade union leaders by Teresa Rudnicka and Ryszarda Socha; places and dates not given: “Dangerous Liaisons: Trade Union Leaders Try To Avoid Political Entanglements, but Most Often They Have No Way Out”]

[Text] (Below follow interviews with individual trade union leaders.)

#### Marian Jurczyk, Chairman, “Solidarity ’80”:

1. [PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] Who should govern in Poland?

[Jurczyk] Since the verb “to govern” derives from “government,” the answer seems implicit. The economy should be governed by a government consisting—and this is highly important—of honest professionals. But I think that even such a cabinet would not meet social expectations unless Poland is a law-governed state. Anyone holding a position, whether that of a charwoman, the premier, or the president, should be aware of his or her immediate accountability for dishonesty,



mismanagement, bribetaking, or pilfering. Unless we introduce such a mechanism and begin to implement it, we cannot count on political and economic stability in our country.

2. [PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] Is Solidarity '80 interested in becoming directly involved in politics?

[Jurczyk] Solidarity '80 is and, as long as I remain its head, shall remain a trade union defending the interests of workers and keeping its distance from any political party, government, or administration. I believe that a trade union should not intend to assume national governance. A trade union should instead champion social protection policies, that is, attend to protecting the worker and the employee. I see no need nor sense either in the inclusion of trade union in the management of the economy. That is a function of the government and, at lower levels, of workplace managers, not of trade unions. It matters, however, that trade unions have experts of their own, independent of the government, who would provide unionists during all kinds of bargaining with a complete picture of the country's economic situation. This way, justified demands could be put forward during wage negotiations and trade unions could be treated as a serious partner in talks.

One other comment: Although I am resolutely opposed to the involvement of trade unions in political activities, I believe that they should in some way maintain an amicable relationship with the political parties whose social and economic programs of action are acceptable to members of a given trade union. The Sejm deputies from these parties should take part in drafting any legislation of concern to trade unions. Should this desideratum be fulfilled, there would not arise situations in which decisions concerning, e.g., wage increases, are taken without consulting the trade unions. It should be borne in mind, however, that it is not trade unions that should court the support political parties but the other way around. It is rather that the leaders of these parties should court trade-union support, and not only before elections at that.

3. [PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] Can a single national trade-union federation be established in Poland?

[Jurczyk] What for? Instead of relying on forced solutions, why not emulate models that have proved themselves in the Western democracies? Over there, several trade union federations operate in the same country, and the contest among them is based not on brute force or duress but on competitive rules. And it so happens that such competition is producing positive results in various domains of the life of the society.

In my opinion, any worker, blue or white-collar, whatever, must be provided with the so-called alternative, that is with the freedom of choice of trade union. If he feels that his interests will be best served by Trade Union X, let him join it. If he trusts Trade Union Y, let him join it instead: It is up to him.

Competition is really very healthy, on condition that it does not concern paramount issues, meaning those which, in the interest of the rights of workers, require that representatives of different trade union federations should sit down together at the same table and work out a common position on them. Besides, I think that soon now we shall reach precisely this conclusion and begin to translate it into reality.

**Marian Krzaklewski, NSZZ [Independent Self-Governing Trade Union] Solidarity Chairman:**

1. [PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] Who should govern in Poland?

[Krzaklewski] The government should govern, in cooperation with the parliament, which should not let its legislative powers become blurred. I say this because lately the parliament has been appropriating desultorily, from event to event, rather than consistently, some of the decisionmaking powers which should belong to the executive. Here I am thinking of, for example, the economic emergency measures and personnel decisions. Under the Bielecki Administration, nearly two months ago, there was a vacancy for the position of minister of industry because the Sejm's Industrial Policy Committee was blocking the nominations. The new candidate did not know whether he was a regular minister or an acting minister. In a period when much could be accomplished through constructive talks, this country lacked a minister of industry—and the trade unions a partner for dialogue.

Hence, executive powers should be distinctly separated from legislative powers and the competences and accountability of discrete executive agencies clearly detailed. Moreover, these powers should be exercised by competent individuals, professionals, but this is precisely the field where problems have always been encountered. I believe therefore that special measures should be taken to strengthen the government. As far as economic matters are concerned, tried and tested managers can be trusted to be conversant with them. And there are such managers. Even at state owned plants. I myself could recommend 15 or so names. But I shall not provide them to the press because, after all, a plant manager is an adversary so far as a trade union is concerned. In the event of some dispute he might use the argument, "Your trade-union head said that I am a good manager, so why are you fighting me?"

One more thing: The president should have the right to control the powers of the executive, especially in the domains in which they are relatively ineffective. I am thinking of all those abuses, scams, and instances of ineffective performance of the judiciary and of control institutions.

2. [PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] Is NSZZ Solidarity interested in becoming directly involved in politics?

[Krzaklewski] NSZZ Solidarity has not exercised, and may not aspire to exercise, political power. We leave this to the political parties, which were formed for that



purpose. One proof of the distancing of our trade union from that role is the fact that it administers an extensive structure in the form of some 22,000 plant Solidarity committees, along with regional Solidarity boards, offices, telephones, telex equipment, and publishing houses, yet in the recent elections we were the sole political force to opt for self-restraint; our electoral lists were only 40 percent complete. Subsequently, most of our Sejm deputies offered conditional voting support for Premier Olszewski, but we joined neither the ruling coalition nor the government it has formed. We intend to similarly abstain in the future. We rest content with the legislative initiatives put forward by our Sejm deputies, who are active in specific committees and debates.

It is said that Solidarity was in power for two years. But that refers not so much to Solidarity's trade unionists as to the politicians at its periphery. As a trade union we have been a petitioner vis a vis "our" successive governments [Mazowiecki and Bielecki Administrations], sometimes even laboring under considerable constraint because representatives of these governments complained about our pressuring them precisely on the grounds that they themselves also derived from Solidarity. This is demonstrated by the records of numerous negotiations. The fact that for nearly a year now there has been no government telephone on my desk I consider as symptomatic.

3. [PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] Should a single national trade union federation be established in Poland?

[Krzaklewski] That is a good idea. But first circumstances must arise in favor of unifying not only the structures but the ideas of trade unions. The effects the martial law era manipulation of trade unions represent a wound that is hard to heal. It may be that some of the people who had joined the [communist-sponsored] OPZZ [National Trade Union Alliance] were men of goodwill but they were incorporated in a structure formed from the top down and alien to the structure of a free trade union. And afterward the will to cleanse the stables, to restructure the OPZZ from the bottom up, in emulation of free trade unions, has been lacking. That is why the OPZZ is not a member of the international organizations associating such trade unions, although it has been and is trying to be admitted to them.

Another issue is the dues money confiscated from Solidarity by the martial law authorities and transferred to the OPZZ. Not only has the OPZZ failed to return these funds but also instructed some of its structures on how to exploit loopholes in the law governing the restitution of property. It has sued in this connection before the Constitutional Tribunal, and before the ILO [International Labor Organization] in Geneva.

Until these issues are resolved, I see no possibility of reaching any accord whatsoever [with the OPZZ]. But as for Solidarity '80 I have unequivocally moved in the direction of establishing dialogue with it, reaching a kind

of nonaggression pact, especially in the Szczecin Region, where that trade union federation is highly influential. Through the mediation of Jan Rulewski, who had, along with Marian Jurczyk, once been a member of the Working Group, I transmitted a letter on this matter. Unfortunately I have not received any direct reply. There were instead the unpleasant and somewhat insulting public comments of certain leaders of Solidarity '80 following the deliberations of the KKP [Solidarity's National Negotiating Commission] in Walecz. Yet none of our suggestions was meant to be insulting toward Solidarity '81.

It seems to me, however, that decisions at the top are not necessarily indispensable to a fusion of our trade union federations. This may be accomplished at the level of plant trade union committees. At the same time I do not think that this should entail the establishment of a new trade union federation. Instead, one of the existing federations should be chosen. The several hundred local free plant trade unions have elected NSZZ Solidarity to be their federation, on at the same time accepting its affiliation with international and European confederations of trade unions.

**Ewa Spychalska, OPZZ Chairperson:**

1. [PREGLAD TYGODNIOWY] Who should govern in Poland?

[Spychalska] The OPZZ supports the opinion of a certain American historian who had once claimed that democracy is "an exceptionally difficult form of governing, because under it the government should direct the people, which directs the government." But now speaking quite seriously, we elect deputies and senators in order that they may make laws that serve the society and the state. And the government is formed with the consent of these deputies and senators in order to be a body implementing the decisions of the parliament. That implementation should not proceed, however, by the method of administrative fiat and special enabling powers for the government, because then we would have a dictatorship. Such a method has already been practiced in many countries and it has proved unworkable, so that it is not worth trying. Thus, it always will turn out that the soundest system of government is a system with a democratic nature.

2. [PREGLAD TYGODNIOWY] Is the OPZZ interested in becoming directly involved in politics?

[Spychalska] No, no, and once more no! No, although, of course, I realize that some of the purposes and objectives of our work as trade unionists directly relate to actions of the political type. After all, we are not indifferent to the nature of the system of society prevailing in Poland, and to the place and role assigned to trade unions in that system, as well as, most importantly, to the place and role it assigns to the individual, to the member of the community.

I do not intend, however, to entangle myself or our trade union in any ideology or in ideological disputes. The OPZZ is inclined to support any political grouping whose objectives and aspirations converge with ours. If it turns out, for example, that Center Accord proposes in the Sejm draft legislation favorable to working people, we shall support Center Accord, and if the author of such initiatives happens to be the Christian National Union, we shall support it too. Such support may, of course, be viewed as "political involvement." Deplorable as it may be in Poland as yet everything is linked to politics. If the rights and duties of institutions in this country were more clearly demarcated, if the role to be exercised by trade unions were defined more precisely, they would not have to put forward their own candidates for parliamentary deputies in order to protect the rights of workers. And in general then they would not have to operate in the domains which should, properly speaking, belong to organizations of a political nature. And since for the time being things are as they are, because most of the political parties operate on the basis of the personalities of their leaders rather than on the basis of specific programs of action, and also since these leaders aspire to either power or glamorous fame, the trade unions of necessity become politically involved.

3. [PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] Should a single national trade union federation be formed in Poland?

[Spychalska] I am a supporter of trade union pluralism. I believe that a situation in which different trade union federations exist and, in one way or another, compete at the same time is both normal and advantageous to working people. But there also exist matters on which the different federations should unite irrespective of their ideological outlook. After all, the members of a trade union elect their representatives precisely for the purpose of protecting their interests. Only the forms of that protection should be debatable.

I can guess that your question was prompted by the resemblance between the present coexistence of trade union federations and the back and forth batting of a ping-pong ball. There is heated competition over which federation is most deserving, most dominant and fundamental, and which federation should "slink off with its tail between its legs," subordinate itself, or better still act as if it were nonexistent. But my hope is that in the not distant future these skirmishes and ambushes shall fade away and, in matters that are fundamental to any trade union federation, we shall begin to cooperate, while engaging in healthy competition on other matters.

#### **New Church Territorial Divisions Proposed**

92EP0175A Warsaw LAD in Polish No 50, 15 Dec 91  
p 2

[Article by Jan M. Ruman: "New Dioceses"]

[Text] More and more is being said in church circles about the new territorial division of the Catholic Church

in Poland. During his fourth apostolic trip to his fatherland, the Holy Father established two new dioceses: one in Bialystok, the other in Drohiczyn. This was in connection with the changes occurring in the countries on our Eastern border—changes that brought freedom and normalized the situation of the Church in the Vilnius archdiocese and in the Pinsk diocese, to which Bialystok and Drohiczyn formerly belonged. It is difficult to say today what the fate of the apostolic administration in Lubaczow, which is a small piece of the Lvov archdiocese, will be. Possibly this small area will find itself within the boundaries of the Polish diocese adjacent to it. In any case, the matter of the so-called Eastern wall seems to have been regulated.

Now a division of the largest, from the standpoint of area and number of people, Polish diocese, is being examined. As a result of this division, new bishoprics most likely will be established in Elblag, Elk, Legnica, Kalisz, Stalowa Wola, Lowicz, and Zamosc. Presumably, a division of Warsaw is also being considered. The decision on a possible new territorial division of the church in Poland lies with the Apostolic See. Perhaps at the beginning of next year we will learn what the final determinations will be. It is not a case of preempting these decisions, but if we are already hearing about plans for a new territorial division of the church in Poland, then it is worth giving some thought to what this possible reform will mean to us, the faithful.

Past experience has shown that in the largest dioceses the contact of the bishop ordinaries with the faithful was made very difficult. The ordinary, who is the pastor of the whole diocese, could not always visit the parishes who were waiting for him and acquaint himself with the problems and joys that make up their everyday life. But in recent years, still more has been learned. In two of the cities mentioned above as hypothetical sees of new dioceses—Stalowa Wola and Lowicz—auxiliary bishops reside in a diocese within whose borders these cities are located. This was very good because it made for more frequent contacts between the faithful and the clergy with the bishop. It is possible that this favorable experience was taken into consideration when changes in the borders of the dioceses were being planned.

The church is a community, God's people, made up of the hierarchy and the faithful. That is why all changes aimed at tightening the bonds between the laity and the secular hierarchy, and the priests and the bishop ordinaries, should be perceived primarily as a reform which makes community contact of God's people a reality. If the changes which I mention, based on unofficial information, in one or another form become a fact, then certainly they will make it possible for bishops to be closer to the faithful.

#### **Privatization Strategy on 'Offensive'**

92EP0200A Warsaw PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY  
in Polish No 3, 17 Jan 92 p 3

[Interview with Tomasz Gruszecki, director, Ministry of Ownership Transformation, by Joanna Jachmann; place

and date not given: "Privatization—Not at any Price" under the rubric "Interview of the Week"]

[Text] [Jachmann] Two years ago, when the public had learned about privatization, that program looked like a panacea for all our economic ills. State property would be privatized, new owners would arise, people would begin to work on their own behalf, production would increase, and the recession would end.... Yet so far only a few enterprises could be privatized, and that has moreover been done to the accompaniment of incessant criticism of the ways and means of appraising their worth. It is true that the public is not standing in line for privatization vouchers, but that is rather due to poor organization of their sales. At the future Ministry of the Economy you will head the—let us call it that—department of privatization. Hence my question: How will this situation change?

[Gruszecki] Admittedly, two years ago the reigning mood, which had affected me too, was that it would be enough for the will for nationwide privatization to exist in order for words to become deeds. We had not realized how complicated all that would be. The program of the two previous administrations, that is, the program of Leszek Balcerowicz, was built on the assumption that a market economy can operate only on the basis of a predominance of private ownership. Nowadays it can be seen how inconsistent that program had been. If nationwide privatization is to be carried out on the premise that private ownership counts most, it should be carried out as speedily as possible, on exploiting all the available opportunities such as reprivatization [restitution of nationalized property to original private owners], employee stock ownership (if the workforces so desire), and stock-voucher privatization—because such measures are crucial to the success of the program. Yet the government, which in theory opted for speedy privatization, in practice, implementing a British style privatization, has been doing it slowly. Instead of an integral approach, every enterprise was treated like a world of its own, and had its value appraised separately by foreign companies so that finally, after months of preparations, a few pampered "grade-A" enterprises were privatized. On the occasion it turned out that this approach to privatization is not only slow but relatively ineffective, considering that 20 percent of overall income was absorbed by the cost of the preparations. Unfortunately, it is not possible to drive a cheap car rapidly.

[Jachmann] It seems to me that public enthusiasm for privatization, which undoubtedly used to exist, has become largely dissipated. Hence the privatization program has to be modified.

[Gruszecki] The essence of my program is that property, whether state or private, is sacred. The present situation is such that any attempt to bring order into state property, identify the owner, and accept responsibility, is considered as some kind of etatism. I definitely disagree with this. What is state-owned at present may be private in the future, and hence the quality of the condition of

ownership needs to be absolutely protected. Nowadays a foreign investor who desires to buy a Polish enterprise has to negotiate separately with the following individuals: the chairman of the Agency for Foreign Investments, the minister of foreign economic cooperation, the minister of finance, the appropriate voivode, and several other people. This is senseless. There has to be one owner in one place.

[Jachmann] And who is that owner to be? The Treasury?

[Gruszecki] Yes, except it should be not so much the Treasury itself as its local representatives, who would have to be authorized to sign the contracts for the sale of enterprises as a whole.

[Jachmann] That is not so simple. Modes of ownership in Poland are totally blurred.

[Gruszecki] I consider clearing up this problem to be a priority. It is difficult to speak seriously of privatization in a situation in which the owner of a parcel of land on which a factory was built may suddenly appear.

[Jachmann] But should not priority be given to taking an inventory of state property as soon as possible and identifying the enterprises which should and can be privatized first?

[Gruszecki] Unfortunately, as far as privatization is concerned, nearly all of its aspects demand priority treatment. I have repeatedly stated that the privatization of 10 percent of state property does not mean that the remaining 90 percent should be left disused. The state-owned sector will continue to exist for the next few years, and a policy of utilizing it more effectively is needed.

[Jachmann] Let us return to privatization. If I understand it well, instead of being abandoned, it will be pursued more aggressively.

[Gruszecki] Privatization must be a part of the government's economic program. It cannot be accomplished in isolation from other domains of the economy. The targeted program of the government also includes a targeted program for privatization. If I am to identify the basic directions of privatization, I wish that we should first of all realize that a radical expansion of the scale of "privatization through bankruptcies" is to be expected in the very near future. The existing structures must be enabled to absorb rapidly the anticipated huge upsurge in that kind of privatization. The shutdown of an unprofitable state enterprise does not mean that its assets are to be given away or dissipated and its workforce to be left unemployed. Thus, when dividing privatization into privatization through bankruptcies and capitalized privatization, care should be taken for both kinds to function in some advantageous symbiosis.

[Jachmann] So far privatization has been pursued behind closed doors, so to speak, and it has been meeting with resolute resistance from workforces, including those which had initially been receptive toward it.

[Gruszecki] This should, of course, come to an end. Privatization must take place publicly. Of course, the final decision should belong to the state as the selling owner, but, if social tensions are to be avoided, the interest of the workforces in the privatization process should be maximally encouraged; the employees should be made to perceive the personal advantages accruing thereby to them. On the occasion, let me recall the abandoned approach to privatization through employee stock ownership. Wherever the workforces express interest in that form of privatization, it should be revived.

[Jachmann] But all these are plans for the future. Does this mean that, until the Ministry of the Economy is organized, until the needed legislation is passed, privatization will be suspended?

[Gruszecki] Of course not. We should distinguish between the concepts of strategy and emergency measures. The latter may be taken by specialized agencies operating on commercial principles. That is why the most urgent issue at present is to establish privatization servicing financial institutions, such as holding companies or investment banks, and to take measures to restructure state enterprises and treasury companies. If we want the privatization to be conducted in a lucid and properly organized manner, offices endowed with powers of sole owner, needed to sell state enterprises, should at the same time be established within the Ministry of Ownership Transformation. This can be done without first having to wait for a broad economic program to be legislated.

**Priorities for Military Education, Research**

92BA0490A Bucharest VIATA ARMATEI in Romanian  
Dec 91 pp 12-13

[Unattributed interviews with high ranking officers; place and date not given: "Science, Education, and Culture: Current Priorities in the Army"]

[Excerpt] For the military establishment, which is legitimately viewed as a factor of stability in Romanian society, the opportunities opened up after the revolution of December 1989 brought about visible changes in the areas of education, culture, and science, too, as in fact in all the areas of activity.

In the area of concept and creative initiative, one of the consequences of the elimination of the ideological and political barriers (as is known, the Army is not involved in political confrontations and is thus not influenced by any ideology; its only policy and ideology is the defense of the country) and the democratization of military life was to unfetter the thinking process. At this level, new regulations are being established reflecting the requirements of a law-governed state and of public life, new and more functional structures are being designed, and everything is being modernized. Local traditions and innovations are also being combined with progressive world experiences as information is circulating freely, and what is useful and profitable is being adopted. However, like in any market economy, projects, however promising they may be, must be considered primarily on the basis of costs and the available material and financial resources at the implementation and practical application level, and in that respect the situation is more difficult. Consequently, priorities have been established and there is even a strategy of priorities. What are these priorities in the above mentioned areas and what have been the contributions of the revolution in the domains of scientific research, military education, and culture in the Army? We addressed these questions to several responsible army sources who kindly agreed to participate in our study.

**Major General Constantin Anghel, inspector general of the General Inspectorate for Military Education:** In the past two years Romania's military education underwent a process of fundamental review. Our basic idea was to preserve what was valuable in the traditions of the Romanian military school.

At the same time, we studied military education in other countries, too, for example in France and England.

Currently we are almost at the end of the stage of establishing new, modern education structures. We created the General Inspectorate for Military Education as the specialized body of the Ministry of National Defense in charge of this area; we also opened the Mircea cel Batrin Naval Academy, the Technical Military Academy, the Academy of Higher Military Studies (a three-year school), the Army Physical Education School,

and the Institute for Military Medicine; the former military officers schools have become military institutes of higher education.

At the same time, we have been working on legal acts designed to regulate military education so as to make it capable of autonomy, flexibility, creativity, and performance. They are aimed at precisely establishing the requirements that need to be met by the educational system, and at giving a new status to the relationship between teachers and students; the center of gravity of the education process is being shifted to the students, while the teachers are becoming their "advisors," who in fact teach them how to study.

The changes have been many and essential, impossible to summarize in a few words. I will cite one fact that reflects the nature of these changes and the serious work invested in achieving them: Recently, together with a commission of the Ministry of Education and Science (with which we have an excellent cooperation), we did a complex study of several military institutes. At the end of it, the commission members admitted that they envied the manner in which we designed and structured the process of education, the training of teachers, and the material resources of our education system. Nevertheless, we are still pretty far from having fulfilled all our objectives.

**Major General Ion Safta, director of the Institute of Military History and Doctrine:** Our institute was established to reorganize the research activities in those two areas. The status of the researcher has fundamentally changed in the new conditions. Freed from the pressure of political guidelines and multiple ideological lines or barriers, both history and military doctrine researchers can now grapple only with the vastness or depth of their area and enjoy unlimited opportunities for using their talents. The results obtained in this short time entitle me to state that we are on a good path and that we have a reserve of capable and competent researchers engaged in useful studies of a great interest concerning both issues of national security and defense strategy, and matters that until recently were handled from an ideological viewpoint or simply erased from our military history. For example, one difficult but particularly important study was Romania's Defense Doctrine, whose compilation required a reevaluation of previous works as well as new investigations regarding the current political, economic, administrative, etc. context. The work was also presented in Vienna and at the International Seminar on Defense Doctrines, where it was praised by the participants. At this time the study has been endorsed by the Supreme Defense Council and is being published in ARMATA ROMANIEI for the purpose of public debate, so that its final version can express as realistically as possible the manner in which we plan to reorganize the country's defense. Also at an advanced stage is another study that I think will arouse interest. It deals with the Romanian-Hungarian political and military relations. Another team has already completed the first stage of



compilation of a collection of studies concerning parliamentary debates on national defense, which will illustrate the place and role of our military establishment in the law-governed state and which we are endeavoring to place at the disposal of those interested, simultaneously with the new legislation of our parliamentary institution.

The deeper study of military doctrine, national security, and defense strategies has also made us determined to delve deeper into the research of various aspects, such as the modern army, the nature of modern war, and so forth. On these two topics we have held talks with various British experts who verified the usefulness of our choice in view of the fact that similar topics are currently being studied by Western military scholars. For example, the Military Publishing House now has on the presses a study that summarizes a string of conclusions and lessons regarding the Gulf war, which we are certain will attract the attention of the readers.

In the area of military history, in the wake of discussions held at the institute, we decided the areas in which we will expand the research and in which the science of history was found lacking because of the former known conditions. Two studies have already been published in Romanian, French, and English, which were presented at the Zurich international colloquium on military history, where they received praise: "The Romanian Army on the West Front, 1944-45" and "War and Mountains in the Military History of the Romanian People." Work is in progress on a collection of documents concerning the 1939-45 period, as well as on one that is a work of the heart and a duty of conscience: "The Romanian Army on the Eastern Front," which will appear in two volumes. Along this line, we will establish a memoirs department that will permit us to tap an invaluable treasure trove of veterans' reminiscences. We are also in the process of finishing a study on the contribution of the Army to the December 1989 revolution which, in addition to its historical value, will serve as a working tool for the military commands and units.

Before finishing, I want to stress that the current conditions have also had a positive impact on expanding our relations with similar fora and institutes abroad and on improving our research methodology, thanks to the establishment of a computer data base and the diversification of scientific events (international symposia and briefing sessions) that we are organizing through the Romanian Military History Commission and through the regional branches of our institute that are already operating in eight major cities in the country.

To complete the image of the efforts made by our institute to utilize the new conditions created by the revolution, we need to add to the above a considerable number of articles, studies, summaries, and documentaries that our researchers are communicating to the public by means of the written and electronic media.

**Colonel George Ionescu, head of the National Military Circle:** Aside from its representative nature as an institution recognized in the postrevolution period—recognized also by the many foreign political and military figures who visited it—the National Military Circle has rapidly developed in the past two years to become a dynamic and complex venue of cultural creativity. Every day our more than 2,000 friends attend the more than 100 auditoriums of the circle on their own initiative. At the same time, thanks to the broad opportunities it offers, the circle has also become a place of meeting between military generations, among prominent Romanian and foreign political personalities, as well as a meeting place for businessmen and a center of entertainment and leisure vital, I would say, for our life. All this entitles us to trust that our ambitious work is useful and verifies the growing presence of the National Military Circle in the cultural landscape of Bucharest and the country.

Of course, those who know us well—because some garrison cadres still view us from the perspective of past mentalities—are in a position to speak, and do speak, much to our gratification, of the changes introduced in the scope of interests of our institution. In addition to circles, seminars, and various classes of broad interest—to the always filled rooms of our video and movie clubs, or the night programs of the Vox Maris disco—we regularly organize tours, exhibitions, and art auctions, and recently grand show balls. These activities are generally organized by sponsors in conjunction with various associations and firms, prominent members of the cultural and artistic life, and others.

At the same time, one of our ongoing endeavors is devoted to specific, authentic indigenous cultural shows, refreshed by professionalism as well as by the fact that these are subsidized from our own revenues—never from the budget. Such events, which I want to stress are free to the public, are populated by recognized names from the most varied areas: science, history, military, down to contemporary art and to fashion shows. Having completely separated ourselves from the ideological practices of the recent past, we often have the satisfaction of positive reactions to events and shows presented by us for the first time and attended by the highest level audiences. Such achievements, we must add, are due to the dedicated work of the personnel of our institution.

The National Military Circle has the capability and will endeavor to further offer its public the most diverse and best possible activities, that being one of the honorable duties of culture. I believe that the goals of a cultural-scientific forum like ours can be more readily attained in the context of a market economy. Consequently, we hope that certain misunderstandings or reservations shown by some commanding and even ministry cadres concerning the products of our activities—and not lastly, concerning tourism and entertainment—will be overcome. We expect broader support for the implementation of our ideas and initiatives, solely in order to meet the tastes of our large audience.

**Colonel Neculai Balan, head of the Social Studies Department of the Army:** The professional, institutionalized treatment of social developments in the Army, the process of diagnosing social processes, and the planning of social intervention strategies, within the broader context of modernization of the Army, have led to the establishment of the Social Studies Department of the Army on 1 March 1990.

The major achievements of our activities were governed by two types of products, namely:

a) Opinion polls and sociological field studies (the public's attitude toward the Army, the views of the cadres on various aspects of military life, the cadres' family budgets, unit morale, quality of life in the Army, the values and behavior patterns of young cadres, the social prestige of the military establishment and profession, etc.).

b) Social strategy studies (improving the managerial competence of commanding officers, the stages of a military career, the strategy of creating a social image for the Army, the curriculum of managerial classes and of computer-aided classes, etc.). We want to believe that the major decisions of the Ministry of National Defense will reflect the results of our studies and recommendations.

**Colonel Gheorghe Vaduva, editor in chief of ARMATA ROMANIEI:** First of all, we are coming out of a maze, or more precisely out of an enclosure reminiscent of a Kafkaesque world. I always had faith in people, in my colleagues, and never concealed anything from them, and I want to believe that they didn't hide things from

me, either. The revolution did not change the essence of my relations with the people around me. On the other hand, it enabled me to say exactly what I think and to completely abandon stupid precautions. I view this opportunity not as an overflow, as a breaking of boundaries, but as a responsibility. The spoken or written word is not and cannot constitute a polluting outflow, poison, or anything like that. Our world, the world of the Army, is too clean and too serene to have room for chicanery and nastiness of all kinds. Respect for the other person, consideration, and moderation cannot be absent from a dialogue between people. This is even more true when it comes to troops and officers. However, I think that the most important gain is the ability to fight for restoring the values to their rights and for securing consideration and reconsideration for our military values. This struggle is rife with enthusiasm and fierce determination, but also with discontent, fear, and disappointment. I feel all of them, like anybody else.

Priorities? Almost everything we plan to achieve may be viewed as a priority. But the natural impatience to move amid the broadest possible space and to modernize the institution of the Army and all its departments, which is the first impulse affecting all of us, needs to be aligned with the available economic and financial resources. We have managed to provide electronic equipment for military editorial offices; in the next budget year we hope that the Ministry will help us procure offset printing facilities, so that our finished products—the newspapers, magazines, and books brought out by the Military Publishing House—can improve the quality of their graphic presentation. However, as I said in the beginning, our first priority is the contents of the material we offer to the readership. [passage omitted]

### **Dedakovic's Return to Vukovar Alleged**

92BA0486B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 4 Feb 92  
p 23

[Interview with Mile "Hawk" Dedakovic, commander of the defense of Vukovar, by Jelena Lovric; place and date not given: "Is the Hawk Returning to Vukovar?"]

[Text] The news has leaked to the public that Mile "Hawk" Dedakovic, a man whom a large segment of the Croatian public considers a hero, but who since the fall of Vukovar has been imprisoned and mistreated as a traitor—is going back to Vukovar with his fighting men. Hawk's return to military involvement could mean that what began with his arrest is being abandoned. Perhaps they even want to rehabilitate him? But also an attempt to try to achieve the same thing now by other means, especially because the methods of the secret police have proved unsuccessful. It is easy to get killed on the battlefield, and there is always the possibility of that one extra bullet.

According to certain information, some important Croats in the diaspora are insisting on Hawk's involvement. They are said to make even their financial aid contingent upon certain names that after the fall of Vukovar ended up on the other side of the locked door. But we also hear that at the highest level, and at the same time that means the commander in chief of the Croatian army is not ready to settle the matter that way. Especially because that outcome is still felt there as a weakening of its own positions. At the same time, the fighters from Vukovar are wandering lost through Zagreb and, they will tell you whenever you meet them, they are awaiting the sound of their trumpet, but still they are throwing away their summons for mobilization with a smile and are not reporting. Where is one to seek an answer to all these dilemmas if not from Hawk?

[Dedakovic] My status is unresolved. In formal law, I am still an officer of our Croatian army, but I am not even receiving a salary, although I am entitled to it; I have no social welfare, and my family and I do not even have health insurance. In that context, it is obvious that assertions that I am going back to Vukovar are not true. But it is true that I would like to go back.

[Lovric] What are your relations with the Supreme Command? You recently told me that since your arrest no one had even called you in for a talk. At the same time, it is being said again that you will seek cancellation of your contract with the Supreme Command.

[Dedakovic] I have not talked with anyone officially. They have not called me in to the Defense Ministry, nor to any of the official government institutions of the Republic of Croatia. There were certain hints that some people in the Supreme Command and Defense Ministry are interested in a conversation and in an agreement on conducting an armed struggle whereby Croatia would obtain its freedom, not just recognition. But that contact was not made, and it was not through any fault of mine.

I still have not asked for the contract to be canceled. Officially, I have only asked that my status be cleared up.

[Lovric] You would go to Vukovar?

[Dedakovic] Not just that I would go, I would certainly go. It is absolutely a marginal matter for me whether I will go as a Croatian officer and commander or as, we might say, an ordinary member of the Guard and a volunteer. But I will go—for me, there is no dilemma at all about that. Some of the gentlemen in the government have been crude and incorrect, to say the least, about my feelings for Vukovar and especially about the fighting men of Vukovar. They were and still are the obsession of my life. Our ultimate goal is to go back to Vukovar and hold a meeting in that hotel where the occupiers held their press conference. We have already arranged for an assembly of fighting men of Vukovar in the Hotel Dunav. That is our ultimate goal.

[Lovric] Did the offer for you to go back to Vukovar actually signify your rehabilitation?

[Dedakovic] One cannot speak of rehabilitation, although some of my friends, who are seeking my return, are saying precisely that. There can be no talk of rehabilitation when I have not even been charged. And if this is rehabilitation from what I have experienced recently, I will never seek that, nor do I have any desire for someone to rehabilitate me. I have an immense desire for Vukovar to be rehabilitated. I am a marginal figure; I was in that position by a combination of circumstances, and someone else might very well have been there. But they must rehabilitate Vukovar, like it or not.

[Lovric] Under what conditions would you go back to the Vukovar battlefield? I am speaking about conditions, because larger forces are certainly required to get Vukovar back than for its defense.

[Dedakovic] Yes, one cannot just go back, that would not yield the appropriate results. Because the first and basic goal is to bring Vukovar back under Croatian protection, which it absolutely does not have now, but it is equally essential to achieve this with the fewest possible sacrifices. I suppose that this is the goal of all in Croatia. And if that is to be possible, the families of the fighting men of Vukovar must first be given appropriate accommodations. The fighting men must urgently be moved out of the barracks, gymnasiums, and hotels. Zagreb has more than 12,000 housing units that belong to the military, and the tenants have moved out of somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000 of them. I think that the entire population of Croatia would agree that 700 housing units could be set aside for the fighting men of Vukovar. According to our figures, only four or five fighters from Vukovar have received housing in a year. Another condition is that the fighting men be given adequate weapons, and by this I mean everything that is in the complement. After all, all the fighting men with whom I have talked feel that there is no longer any point in being clay pigeons as we were before.

[Lovric] Why are they trying to form a Vukovar Brigade without you and your fighters from Vukovar? Supposedly, some segments of it have been housed in Djakovo in barracks which at one time the army used possibly in the summer months.

[Dedakovic] I do not know why it has taken that turn. Actually, I do know, but that is a question you should put to those who did it. However, it obviously has not turned out as they imagined. They thought it was enough to say Vukovar Brigade, and everyone would immediately come running. However, the fighting men of Vukovar demand an adequate, professional, and authoritative leadership, people in whom they have confidence. I am profoundly convinced that the 124th Brigade was created in order to move the fighters of Vukovar out of Zagreb and take them to the front lines. But this was done in a clumsy manner, to say the least, and the fighting men of Vukovar did not accept. It is also the truth that among other places they have been accommodated in those inappropriate barracks near Djakovo, where they do not have even the basic conditions for life.

[Lovric] It is said that there is great dissatisfaction fermenting in the ranks of the Vukovar fighters.

[Dedakovic] I would leave out that "it is said." I think that the psychological factor is very important in all this, because the fighting men of Vukovar who went through horrors cannot reconcile themselves to having been placed in what might be called a standby arrangement. They are dissatisfied and embittered. Everything should really be done quickly to activate those wonderful fighters, who are the equal of any in Croatia.

[Lovric] I heard that a few days ago there was a major incident in the Hotel Internacional, where some of the fighters are being housed.

[Dedakovic] That escalated the day when they made the decision that the fighting men from Vukovar move out of that hotel. They asked me what to do. I told them, first, that they could not behave the way some have. There were even several broken windows. The Society of Vukovar Fighting Men formed a commission which will itself move out all of those fighting men. We will not allow our fighting men to cause trouble. We can understand but cannot accept such behavior.

[Lovric] A sizable number of Vukovar fighting men are said to have been hired by the city police. Some people believe that there could be a conflict between them and those other fighting men from Vukovar. Which, according to certain information, is perhaps the whole point.

[Dedakovic] Only quite a small number has been hired by the city police. But there is no theory of a conflict occurring between them. There might possibly be a conflict between others, but it is simply impossible between those who fought at Vukovar. Regardless of where they are at the moment. There is a close and authentic friendship among them. This is something

which kept Vukovar from surrendering, this is something, I am certain, which has never been recorded in the same way anywhere.

[Lovric] I heard that recently, when the news went out that something was happening to the Vukovar fighting men in Borongaj, their friends came running from all sides, finding various ways to get there, even with their pistols drawn. What happened?

[Dedakovic] Yes, they did come running, and the fighters from all the Zagreb hotels will always come running when they hear a rumor like that. It was a question and is always a question of personal incomes, some kind of selection is made so that those fighters who are not now, as it is put, on the battlefield cannot be paid. Which is absolutely unacceptable to the fighting men from Vukovar, who have families and children.

[Lovric] One hears assertions that they are trying to get the fighting men from Vukovar out of Zagreb, because accustomed as they are to street fighting, they could be very unpleasant if their dissatisfaction boils over.

[Dedakovic] I see no reason for the fear of which you speak. Who would be afraid of their own fighting men? I personally think that it is high time in Croatia that we clear up once and for all what Croatia's priority is, not just in connection with Vukovar. The priority is freedom. That is why Croatia must be first for us all.

Certainly not the president of the Republic, the Assembly, or the government, because all of that is transient. Only Croatia is permanent and eternal.

[Lovric] Is it true that the lists of the Vukovar men, along with personal data, which were drawn up in the Vukovar Club, have fallen into the hands of the enemy and that now they are using them to figure out who their prisoners are? And there is almost no need to say what that means.

[Dedakovic] Yes, it is true that all that information has fallen into the hands of the Serbs and that our people who are their prisoners have still greater problems now.

[Lovric] How do you explain that?

[Dedakovic] Treason, madam! The kind of treason we have had throughout the entire war.

[Lovric] Is it true that Marin "Bili" Vidic, the government commissioner in Vukovar, and the journalist Strusa Glavasevic were barely included in the list for exchange? Is this an explanation of the fact that the lists of Vukovar men done in Zagreb have now been stolen? Perhaps someone does not want them to come back?

[Dedakovic] The first thing is the desire that they not return, and the second is the desire that they be mistreated still more horribly. Although it is difficult to imagine the bestiality with which they are being treated. When the very important Labrador group was being exchanged with Serbia, we had real chances of getting a far larger number of our people back. I was in prison at

the time, but I know that this was done behind the scenes, so that no one knew anything even in the Justice Ministry.

[Lovric] How do you explain that almost nothing at all is said about Bili?

[Dedakovic] Everything that is happening has its explanation. It is well-known that Bili is a very honest man, he fought like a demon for Vukovar, and in that struggle of his to help Vukovar he spoke and wrote things which certain people and institutions did not like. It is certain that if he were to come here—and I hope that he will be coming in the next exchange—he would also tell the truth. I think that this is where the whole problem is.

[Lovric] Is it true that Vukovar Serbs who were on the other side have begun to come to Zagreb?

[Dedakovic] It is true that they have begun to come and it is true that at the very least their treatment is better than the fighting men of Vukovar. I think that this is probably in the context of the policy of living together. However, living together is something imaginary for Vukovar. It does not exist. Are we supposed to live now with people who yesterday slaughtered children and old people and destroyed houses, and they are doing it even today?

[Lovric] Do you think that the only possibility in Vukovar is either all Serbs or all Croats?

[Dedakovic] Yes, anything else is impossible. There are Serbs who will always be welcome, who are truly our brothers, but those are the ones who fought with us, who made the breakthrough with us and who came to Zagreb. There are not many of them, but they are dear to us. We are glad that we have Serbs who took up their guns the first day and fought on the side of Croatia and did not remain in Vukovar when the Chetniks came there. By contrast with the large number of those who were with us in Vukovar, but then when the Chetniks came, they informed on their Croat neighbors.

[Lovric] How do you explain all this that happened to you personally?

[Dedakovic] In all of that, I was, after all, secondary. Policy wanted that Vukovar, that Croatian epic, those wonderful people to simply be torn down and destroyed in some way; do not talk much about Vukovar any longer, it happened, what can we do, a city is gone—so what? Croatia will remain.

[Lovric] Is it true that the fighting men of Vukovar are determined not to respect the blue helmets if this means that Vukovar remains on the other side?

[Dedakovic] The question should be broader. I believe that the fighters throughout eastern Slavonia are unwilling to accept such a solution.

They cannot reconcile themselves to that part being under Serbian domination. Why are we afraid of that?

That Kuwaiti major of the United Nations, when he came to Zagreb, first said that their principal task is to maintain the status quo, and that status obviously suits Serbia very much. This really does not suit Croatia and I hope it does not suit the Supreme Command. The fighters and population of eastern Slavonia will never consent to that.

[Lovric] Some of the fighting men from Vukovar have told me that if they do not get support and weapons from the Supreme Command, they themselves will go and liberate Vukovar.

[Dedakovic] I am aware of that mood, and it is certain that at the very least it will be very difficult to prevent those fighting men from setting out for Vukovar. As far as Vukovar is concerned, I will always be with them. There is no dilemma at all about that.

#### Interview With Candidate for Trade Minister

92BA0465C Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene 27 Jan 92  
p 3

[Article including interview with Joze Jeraj, candidate for trade minister, by Roza Erman; place and date not given: "Strong Competition and Stable Legislation"—first paragraph is DNEVNIK introduction]

[Text] With the right developmental orientation, the door to world supply will also be opened for our trade; from stable agriculture through greater production and thus a greater supply, we can also achieve more stable prices.

Ljubljana, 27 Jan—"Politics is really one thing and expertise is something else, but they should be closely linked together. Politics should make use of the experiences, knowledge, and ability of expertise, and expertise should seek support from politics for the implementation of its plans. I think that politics has to be pragmatic. If I do not have political support, I will not succeed no matter how good the project is. That is why it is very important to me to achieve a broad consensus, and to attract people to participate.

"When it is necessary to carry out some project, I value cooperation with everyone, regardless of party affiliation. Also, the fact that I am a member of two parties indicates that both parties certainly want my participation, and that I am also glad to cooperate with both of them. And, since I do not hold offices in those parties, this 'party duality' is not that much of a burden for me." This was stated by Joze Jeraj, a graduate engineer in agronomy, the vice president of the Ljubljana Executive Council, and Ljubljana secretary for supply, trade, and agriculture. Otherwise, he is also the person whom Prime Minister Peterle has proposed for the new Slovene minister of trade. With this answer, he also explained what it was really like to be a member of two parties,



namely, he is a member of the SKZ-LS [Slovene Peasants' Alliance-People's Party] and the SDZ-NDS [Slovene Democratic Alliance-National Democratic Party].

[Erman] How do you view the current situation in Slovenia and the work of the government?

[Jeraj] We have experienced and survived enormous upheavals. It is unfair to blame the government for failure. It was with a political consensus that we embarked upon independence, and the latter necessarily has consequences in the economy. There has not been enough time for us to be able to recover, and to become closer to Europe. With the settlement of political relations, the economic situation will also improve. Investment in Slovenia will no longer be a political risk, there will be more interest abroad, foreign credits will be more favorable, and the economy will stabilize.

[Erman] In your opinion, how should Slovenia pave its way to the world?

[Jeraj] With a stable economy, developed trade with strong competition, and the right developmental orientations. The door to the European institutions, the EC and the EFTA [European Free Trade Association], has already begun to open, and when the United States recognizes us, the institutions within the UN framework will also be opened. In order for us to be able to make use of the increasingly greater opportunities, solid ties between the Chamber of Commerce and the government are necessary. There can no longer be extensive planning, as in the past; skillful adjustment to the current situation will be necessary. I think that the right orientation is primarily development of the information system, marketing, and promotion. In my opinion, promotional activities are precisely what should not be along the lines of big projects and the opening of new representations abroad. I am in favor of developing such activities here, making them as concrete as possible, and presenting ourselves first of all where we already have representations.

[Erman] What is the role of trade, in your opinion, and how should it be developed?

[Jeraj] Trade is an integral part of the state's economic efforts. I think that two market principles, strong competition and stable legislation, are the basic conditions for the success of trade. Trade should be developed in such a way that competition will exist in all areas. I think that with the passage of property legislation, it will develop automatically. All of the legislation in the area of trade should also be passed as soon as possible. Slovenia is so small that one cannot divide domestic and foreign trade in it, and consequently the proposal in the new legislation for combining both types of trade seems appropriate. To be sure, it is true that everyone, from the government to the individual ministers, is making an effort to open the door to the world for trade as much as possible. I am also in favor of helping trade as much as possible and expanding cooperation with the already

traditional markets of the former Yugoslavia, and also helping to acquire new markets. Trade will be able to conquer those new markets if we help it to raise its technological level, which has so far lagged considerably behind the world level. The role of the reserves should also become more important, and they should have the function of influencing the market; the inspection services should not be just for the purpose of coercion, but also for gathering information.

[Erman] As the Ljubljana secretary for supply, trade, and agriculture, you are familiar with the situation in agriculture and supply, you are familiar with the difficulties, and you can also boast of positive results in resolving them. How do you view the stabilization of food prices?

[Jeraj] I am convinced that a stable agriculture is one of the foundations of a stable economy. I have advocated increasing agricultural production, and I always will. Agriculture should be ensured stable business conditions, and given incentives for larger production, and thus also stable final prices, through a larger supply and sufficient competition. We have to be aware that we cannot equip agriculture to be completely competitive internationally; other states also subsidize agriculture. We have to allocate the subsidies correctly, however. In this regard, I can state that the city of Ljubljana has had quite positive experiences, and that through the proper allocation of what was otherwise a modest amount of money for agriculture, it has been able to improve the liquidity of agriculture considerably. The small response last year on the part of farmers to investments in vegetable production also indicated to us a fear about the uncertainty of sales, and confirmed the Secretariat's efforts to build a wholesale warehouse as soon as possible. I myself think that the Ljubljana wholesale warehouse will be important for all of Slovenia, that it will allow farmers to make sales, that the turnover of goods will be faster, and that greater competition will also bring the consumer a lower price.

### Mass Dismissals of Federal Employees

92BA0503A Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian  
24 Jan 92 p 15

[Article by A. Cubrilo Kosovac: "Dismissals Come to Federal Employees"—first paragraph is POLITIKA introduction]

[Text] By 15 February, it will be known who is leaving and who is staying in any of the 57 federal bodies and organizations; "purges" are possible even after that deadline, but severance pay is uncertain.

Leaving with severance pay of 24 net income paychecks [or 8.5 gross], or remaining in uncertainty—this is the question that is tormenting the employees of 57 federal bodies and organizations these days. A decision on the fate of almost 13,000 federal employees will be made by 15 February, or, as the Federal Executive Council [FEC] says, the employees are being offered an opportunity to

decide for themselves—with the certainty that the federal treasury can no longer maintain the federal administration and that this is objectively imposed by affairs at the level of the federal state—whether to accept any sort of severance pay, or to decide to remain, for a period that in practice is indefinite.

This is because, as recalled by Milos Gavrilovic, the chief of the FEC Personnel Administration, a new "purge" is coming when the employees finish deciding in a few days whether to accept or reject a severance pay of 24 personal incomes. The senior officials of the 57 federal bodies and organizations will assess whether the departure of any of the workers, in a federal administration that is already overfilled, will disrupt continued basic operations in a given federal body or organization.

#### **Will There Be Money for Everyone?**

If it is determined at that time that the given services can still function without the workers in question, only now at a lower level, they will be handed back their work booklets. Gavrilovic is not sure whether these workers will then also have a right to severance pay of 24 net or 8.5 gross personal incomes (on the basis of the average salary over three months). For those who are doing this in the first "round" funds have been planned in the state budget (through loans from the National Bank of Yugoslavia), but no one can guarantee this for the others, the undecided ones (although such a legal possibility exists).

A written agreement will be concluded with the employees whom the senior officials of the bodies consider essential for the continued operation of the federal bodies and organizations. In an extreme case, however, not even they can always breathe a sigh of relief, the FEC says, since it could turn out tomorrow that their work is also superfluous and so they will also end up on the lists of the unemployed.

All in all, at least according to those who are following the streamlining of the federal administration, the most acceptable solution is choosing the severance pay now. Everything else is under a big question mark, and the more time passes, the more unfavorable it is. This attitude is also being confirmed by many federal employees, who now cannot forgive themselves for how many past years they have missed what now seems an irrecoverable opportunity to retire with a favorable administrative pension (if they met the condition of at least 25 years of service). Now this opportunity is only in effect for officials, and an attempt in the federal parliament to revive it for ordinary employees as well, a month or so ago, was unsuccessful.

In addition to the official meetings at which representatives of federal bodies, organizations, and professional and professional-technical services plan the fate of the army of federal employees, informal meetings of employees potentially affected by these measures have already been going on for days and even weeks.

#### **Severance Pay Without Tax**

As usually happens in such cases, people are afraid of arbitrariness in determining suitability for remaining employed, and are suspicious about the objective criteria of their supervisors. This, they complain, is because a considerable number of their bosses have secured themselves in time, forming their own agencies or private firms, and the criteria for the retention or dismissal of their subordinates, they fear, will be personal sympathies, interests, or the repayment of some debt.

Only, whatever the number of those who have chosen in the survey to leave work with a severance pay of 24 personal incomes, it is negligible—even intolerably negligible, the FEC thinks.

And, according to Milos Gavrilovic, the fact that the FEC has not abandoned its employees is proven by the way that officials from the Federal Secretariat for Finance are in constant contact with the Republic Ministry of Finance, and negotiations are being conducted with the Serbian government on exempting the above-mentioned severance pay of 24 personal incomes from taxation.

#### **Protest From Macedonian Officers Organization**

*92BA0492A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA  
in Macedonian 1 Feb 92 p 2*

[Article by D.K.—first paragraph is NOVA MAKEDONIJA introduction]

[Text] This Macedonian officers organization was founded last April for the purpose of preventing Macedonian soldiers from going to the Croatian front. The ordnance and weapons have been moved, while, in the barracks, asphalt roadways have been dug up, and vegetation has been destroyed!

Bitola, 31 Jan—The announcement of the Secret Macedonian-Revolutionary Organization (TMRO-Officers), which was founded in April of last year in the Bitola garrison, was reported this afternoon by Radio Bitola during broadcast of its Pelagonian Chronicle, an information-political program. This news item fully exposed the latest and unparalleled actions of the Serbian high command on the further and definitive destruction of the garrison by transferring its movable property and military ordnance and medical equipment to Serbia.

Among other things, the communication states:

Citizens of Bitola! The TMRO-Officers was established by statute on 13 April 1991. It has acted in the spirit of the government's policy. The main objective of the organization has been to prevent Macedonian soldiers from being sent to the Croatian front. That organization made possible the safe departure of 263 Macedonian soldiers from the Stiv Naumov barracks and their safe return to their homes. Various military and civilian material facilities worth in excess of 1.5 billion dinars

were removed from the barracks. On Saturday, 25 January, when the peaceful protest of Bitola citizens was held in opposition to the moving of the corps field hospital, with its advanced intervention equipment and even its heart surgery section, which could treat as many as 18,000 patients, all security areas were reinforced by adding three guards in full combat readiness. The hospital was moved with the help of 28 barges in the early morning hours of 26 January. Weapons had been removed from 21 posts along the border with Greece, thus partially or entirely crippling the infrastructure, and the inventory has been plundered. Yesterday, as part of the same action, the Tekstil military equipment store was moved. Today Macedonian superior officers will have their side arms confiscated, Scorpio and Magnum pistols, in particular. All asphalt roadways in the barracks have been dug out, and plants are being destroyed. The current activities of the Serbian command in Bitola include making preparations to move 282 nonmilitary

motor vehicles to Serbia, loading up another 460 tons of munitions and mines, and dividing houses between Serbian and Macedonian command personnel loyal to the Serbian army, who already have or are building houses, with a view to their sale. Such houses will be sold in violation of the law for black market currency, mainly to citizens of Albanian origin as a reward for their cowardice.

In addition to all of the hardships and concern for their personal safety and the safety of their families, the Macedonian command personnel belonging to the TMRO-Officers, standing firm and, consequently, condemning and opposing the disgusting plunder committed by the Serbian army, expect the full support of all patriots and citizens in the implementation of the final objective and the assertion of the sovereignty and international recognition of Macedonia, states today's announcement by the TMRO-Officers in Bitola.

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